1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:04,279
Audrow Nash: I've been talking
to robotics companies both in

2
00:00:04,279 --> 00:00:08,700
and out of podcast interviews
for about 10 years now. I hear a

3
00:00:08,700 --> 00:00:13,122
lot of things from them about
working with venture capitalists

4
00:00:13,122 --> 00:00:17,258
and the mismatch in expectations
that creates friction for

5
00:00:17,258 --> 00:00:20,824
founders and people in
technology. In this time, I

6
00:00:20,824 --> 00:00:25,245
haven't talked to many venture
capitalists, and I have not had

7
00:00:25,245 --> 00:00:29,595
any on any podcast I've been
involved with. This interview is

8
00:00:29,595 --> 00:00:33,803
with Sanjay Aggarwal, who leads
the robotics and automation

9
00:00:33,803 --> 00:00:37,796
efforts at the venture firm
F-Prime Capital. This was an

10
00:00:37,796 --> 00:00:42,075
eyeopening discussion for me
because I got to hear the other

11
00:00:42,075 --> 00:00:46,283
side of the story and it makes
good sense to me. My hope in

12
00:00:46,283 --> 00:00:50,347
doing and sharing this interview
is that some current and

13
00:00:50,347 --> 00:00:54,769
aspiring robotics entrepreneurs
and technologists get a better

14
00:00:54,769 --> 00:00:59,119
sense of what VCs want and are
looking for, and that they and

15
00:00:59,119 --> 00:01:03,041
their companies are better off
for it. I also found our

16
00:01:03,041 --> 00:01:07,605
discussion on the macroeconomic
conditions affecting the startup

17
00:01:07,605 --> 00:01:11,884
and investment community oddly
calming, even though it seems

18
00:01:11,884 --> 00:01:16,020
like we're in an unprecedented
time. Lastly, we talk about

19
00:01:16,020 --> 00:01:19,943
F-Prime's State of Robotics
report, which is the second

20
00:01:19,943 --> 00:01:24,293
yearly report that they've made
on the robotics ecosystem. It

21
00:01:24,293 --> 00:01:28,714
looks at robotics investments
between 2019 and 2023 and points

22
00:01:28,714 --> 00:01:32,636
out patterns and trends from
their analysis. There were

23
00:01:32,636 --> 00:01:36,987
interesting results around what
VC money is going towards and

24
00:01:36,987 --> 00:01:40,838
how that has changed in the last
few years. And it was

25
00:01:40,838 --> 00:01:45,330
interesting to put robotics in a
larger context with respect to

26
00:01:45,330 --> 00:01:49,609
other VC investment categories,
like enterprise software. My

27
00:01:49,609 --> 00:01:53,317
main takeaway is that the
popcorn pops of successful

28
00:01:53,317 --> 00:01:57,311
robotics startups are just
beginning and that the future

29
00:01:57,311 --> 00:02:01,946
looks exciting. This episode was
launched at the same time as the

30
00:02:01,946 --> 00:02:05,940
State of Robotics report. The
report is freely available

31
00:02:05,940 --> 00:02:09,934
online. You can find the link.
in the description below.

32
00:02:09,934 --> 00:02:13,000
Without further ado, here's the
interview.​

33
00:02:13,000 --> 00:02:16,000
Audrow Nash: Hi Sanjay, would
you introduce yourself?

34
00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:19,189
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, nice to
meet you, Audrow, and thanks

35
00:02:19,189 --> 00:02:22,486
again for the opportunity. My
name is Sanjay Aggarwal. I work

36
00:02:22,486 --> 00:02:25,622
with F-Prime Capital, an early
stage venture fund based in

37
00:02:25,622 --> 00:02:26,000
Boston.

38
00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:29,000
Audrow Nash: Hell yeah, tell me
about F-Prime.

39
00:02:29,000 --> 00:02:32,776
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, as I
said, we're an early stage fund,

40
00:02:32,776 --> 00:02:36,425
we invest across, enterprise
software, fintech, and then I

41
00:02:36,425 --> 00:02:40,327
lead our efforts looking at the
robotics and automation space,

42
00:02:40,327 --> 00:02:43,724
so we've been active for,
actually we have a kind of a

43
00:02:43,724 --> 00:02:47,626
multi decade history of making
venture investments, and in the

44
00:02:47,626 --> 00:02:51,653
current version of the fund. we
actually have a tech fund, which

45
00:02:51,653 --> 00:02:55,429
I'm part of. We also do a bunch
of work in the life sciences

46
00:02:55,429 --> 00:02:59,267
space, with, assist, another
team, at, at the firm. but quite

47
00:02:59,267 --> 00:03:03,105
active, I would say in early
stage, typically doing series A,

48
00:03:03,105 --> 00:03:06,000
opportunities as a primary focus
area of ours.

49
00:03:06,000 --> 00:03:10,000
Audrow Nash: Gotcha. So seed in
A or just A for this kind of

50
00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:13,824
Sanjay Aggarwal: Mostly A, but
we'll do seed and, we'll do

51
00:03:13,824 --> 00:03:16,000
earlier and later. yeah,
exactly.

52
00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:20,037
Audrow Nash: Okay, awesome. Now
you were saying that you lead

53
00:03:20,037 --> 00:03:24,272
the robotics investment part of
this. Tell me about, tell me how

54
00:03:24,272 --> 00:03:25,000
that works.

55
00:03:25,000 --> 00:03:28,336
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, over the
last few years, there's

56
00:03:28,336 --> 00:03:31,489
obviously been a lot of hype
around the robotics and

57
00:03:31,489 --> 00:03:35,007
automation space, starting
really with the AV market a few

58
00:03:35,007 --> 00:03:38,888
years ago. and we started poking
our head in, into the space and

59
00:03:38,888 --> 00:03:42,284
just trying to get, getting up
to speed. And my personal

60
00:03:42,284 --> 00:03:45,984
background actually was, earlier
in my career, I was actually

61
00:03:45,984 --> 00:03:49,744
working as a robotics engineer
at a, a company that focused on

62
00:03:49,744 --> 00:03:53,504
manufacturing automation, so I
had first hand experience with,

63
00:03:53,504 --> 00:03:56,961
call it the earlier generation
of robotics and automation

64
00:03:56,961 --> 00:04:00,539
solutions. So I had a kind of a
natural affinity toward the

65
00:04:00,539 --> 00:04:04,178
space. And I led the effort to
get ourselves up to speed and

66
00:04:04,178 --> 00:04:08,059
started really looking at the AV
space and had made a couple of,

67
00:04:08,059 --> 00:04:10,000
smallish investments there, but,

68
00:04:10,000 --> 00:04:12,000
Audrow Nash: AV that's
autonomous vehicles,

69
00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:15,150
Sanjay Aggarwal: sorry,
Autonomous Vehicles. Yeah,

70
00:04:15,150 --> 00:04:18,677
Autonomous Vehicles, exactly.
and we spent a lot of time

71
00:04:18,677 --> 00:04:22,709
there. I think as we dug deeper
there, we came to the conclusion

72
00:04:22,709 --> 00:04:26,173
that we preferred more
industrial sort of use cases and

73
00:04:26,173 --> 00:04:29,953
have spent most of the more
recent history, focused on those

74
00:04:29,953 --> 00:04:33,165
sorts of, looking at logistics
and construction and

75
00:04:33,165 --> 00:04:36,000
agriculture, oriented use cases
for robotics.

76
00:04:36,000 --> 00:04:39,190
Audrow Nash: Awesome. Okay. So I
want to come back to this, but

77
00:04:39,190 --> 00:04:40,000
tell me how you,

78
00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:43,571
Audrow Nash: so you mentioned
you were working in the robotics

79
00:04:43,571 --> 00:04:47,314
space. Tell me how, tell me what
your path has been. So how'd you

80
00:04:47,314 --> 00:04:50,654
go from being involved in
robotics and where'd you go from

81
00:04:50,654 --> 00:04:51,000
there?

82
00:04:51,000 --> 00:04:55,057
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, so you
know, as I said, I did a degree

83
00:04:55,057 --> 00:04:59,115
in mechanical engineering and
majored in control systems. And

84
00:04:59,115 --> 00:05:02,573
so robotics was a natural,
starting point for my own

85
00:05:02,573 --> 00:05:06,631
career. It was, in those days,
robotics is not a new concept.

86
00:05:06,631 --> 00:05:10,622
Obviously, it's been around for
generations. and it was very

87
00:05:10,622 --> 00:05:14,679
standardized, repetitive tasks
that you could, automate it in

88
00:05:14,679 --> 00:05:18,537
more sophisticated ways. but it
was, very, just repetitive

89
00:05:18,537 --> 00:05:22,528
tasks, was a focus in those
days. and we built, all sorts of

90
00:05:22,528 --> 00:05:26,452
systems for, semiconductor wafer
handling and optical fiber

91
00:05:26,452 --> 00:05:30,775
manufacturing and these sorts of
things, in those days. but after

92
00:05:30,775 --> 00:05:34,899
a while I decided I just, wanted
to get more into the business

93
00:05:34,899 --> 00:05:38,557
side of things. So I went to
business school, worked at

94
00:05:38,557 --> 00:05:42,149
consulting for a while.
eventually ended up, moving to

95
00:05:42,149 --> 00:05:46,007
India, to start a company,
focused on the mobile messaging

96
00:05:46,007 --> 00:05:49,000
space, and spent a few years
there, and after

97
00:05:49,000 --> 00:05:51,740
Audrow Nash: How did you make
that decision to do that? It

98
00:05:51,740 --> 00:05:54,433
seems like a big leap. I'm
curious what you were thinking

99
00:05:54,433 --> 00:05:55,000
at the time.

100
00:05:55,000 --> 00:05:58,875
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, it's, I
would say that, I guess I always

101
00:05:58,875 --> 00:06:02,750
had the itch in some ways, to do
something entrepreneurial, and

102
00:06:02,750 --> 00:06:06,071
the company I worked for
initially out of school was a

103
00:06:06,071 --> 00:06:09,638
startup, and The opportunity
kind of presented itself with

104
00:06:09,638 --> 00:06:13,452
somebody I knew, in India that
was starting this business. and

105
00:06:13,452 --> 00:06:17,081
so it was just, took a leap of
faith and said, okay, let's,

106
00:06:17,081 --> 00:06:20,463
give this a try. just to try
something, try something a

107
00:06:20,463 --> 00:06:24,461
little bit different than what I
had been doing. which turned out

108
00:06:24,461 --> 00:06:28,275
to be a fantastic experience and
really, rewarding both for me

109
00:06:28,275 --> 00:06:31,965
and my team. personally for
sure, and so did that and really

110
00:06:31,965 --> 00:06:35,840
got a first hand experience of
what it meant to build and run a

111
00:06:35,840 --> 00:06:39,715
startup, and so when we exited
that business and I came back to

112
00:06:39,715 --> 00:06:43,405
Boston, I hooked up with a team
and I knew some of the folks

113
00:06:43,405 --> 00:06:46,788
that already at F-Prime and then
started working on the

114
00:06:46,788 --> 00:06:50,601
investment side of things and,
hopefully leveraging some of my

115
00:06:50,601 --> 00:06:53,000
own experiences from the startup
world.

116
00:06:53,000 --> 00:06:56,298
Audrow Nash: Why did you move
over to investment? What did

117
00:06:56,298 --> 00:06:59,254
you, so leveraging your
experiences from the startup

118
00:06:59,254 --> 00:07:02,438
world, but what was the
motivation there? What were you,

119
00:07:02,438 --> 00:07:05,963
what was the appeal of venture
capital as opposed to just like

120
00:07:05,963 --> 00:07:09,375
starting another startup or
something like this? How did you

121
00:07:09,375 --> 00:07:10,000
look at it?

122
00:07:10,000 --> 00:07:14,500
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I don't
know. I certainly didn't set out

123
00:07:14,500 --> 00:07:18,429
to become an investor I would
say. It was a little more

124
00:07:18,429 --> 00:07:22,786
opportunistic in the sense that
I had worked with some of the

125
00:07:22,786 --> 00:07:27,000
folks. so much for joining us
today, and we hope to see you

126
00:07:27,000 --> 00:07:31,357
again soon. Get reacquainted,
with the local ecosystem. And I

127
00:07:31,357 --> 00:07:36,000
wasn't sure at the time if I was
going to continue with investing

128
00:07:36,000 --> 00:07:40,500
or, get back into a startup. And
I think as I got more and more

129
00:07:40,500 --> 00:07:44,714
absorbed, into investing, just
enjoyed it, like you, it's a

130
00:07:44,714 --> 00:07:49,357
great opportunity to learn, from
very amazing entrepreneurs, the,

131
00:07:49,357 --> 00:07:53,714
the pace of change and the pace
of new ideas is pretty rapid.

132
00:07:53,714 --> 00:07:58,143
And it just, I guess it, I, grew
to like it more and more as I

133
00:07:58,143 --> 00:08:02,714
spent more time. And as I said,
it's it's quite inspiring to, to

134
00:08:02,714 --> 00:08:06,929
see what people are building out
there. And hopefully I can

135
00:08:06,929 --> 00:08:11,429
provide some useful perspective
for my own personal experiences

136
00:08:11,429 --> 00:08:12,000
as well.

137
00:08:12,000 --> 00:08:16,008
Audrow Nash: Hell yeah. Yeah. I
feel like one of the other

138
00:08:16,008 --> 00:08:20,224
things. That I don't know what
your perspective on it is, but

139
00:08:20,224 --> 00:08:24,164
it seems like a lot of people,
if they go do a successful

140
00:08:24,164 --> 00:08:28,449
startup, now you have a lot of
experience. and especially like

141
00:08:28,449 --> 00:08:32,803
you being a strong entrepreneur
on your own, you can go and you

142
00:08:32,803 --> 00:08:36,673
can help the startups do that,
but you can also now your

143
00:08:36,673 --> 00:08:40,889
interest is in robotics. you can
also be an expert in that or

144
00:08:40,889 --> 00:08:45,381
have relative expertise in that,
which is probably very important

145
00:08:45,381 --> 00:08:49,251
for good investment decisions
like that feels like a big

146
00:08:49,251 --> 00:08:53,605
reason or a big benefit of you
going into investment as opposed

147
00:08:53,605 --> 00:08:57,890
to someone who has no experience
in the area making investment

148
00:08:57,890 --> 00:09:01,000
decisions or it may not even be
technical say

149
00:09:01,000 --> 00:09:04,626
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah. I would
say that venture capital used to

150
00:09:04,626 --> 00:09:07,677
be very much, founders who
became investors, That has

151
00:09:07,677 --> 00:09:11,303
changed, and the reason for that
is exactly what you described,

152
00:09:11,303 --> 00:09:14,699
which is that. Okay, you have,
you understand, at least you

153
00:09:14,699 --> 00:09:18,440
have experience on what it takes
to build a business. I would say

154
00:09:18,440 --> 00:09:21,836
that has changed a little bit
over time, that you find more

155
00:09:21,836 --> 00:09:25,290
people that are professional
investors and that has, is what

156
00:09:25,290 --> 00:09:28,858
they've done. but I think the,
expertise that you gain is more

157
00:09:28,858 --> 00:09:32,082
about business building as
opposed to industries per se,

158
00:09:32,082 --> 00:09:35,305
right? in the sense that,
industries are evolving pretty

159
00:09:35,305 --> 00:09:38,873
rapidly, right? And the, and I
always, believe that the people

160
00:09:38,873 --> 00:09:42,442
that have the best ideas, for
businesses are the entrepreneurs

161
00:09:42,442 --> 00:09:45,781
that we're, talking to and
meeting and hopefully investing

162
00:09:45,781 --> 00:09:48,831
in, where we hopefully come in
as having some kind of

163
00:09:48,831 --> 00:09:52,400
overarching view of the industry
as to where it's going. But I

164
00:09:52,400 --> 00:09:55,853
say the nuanced view, which
really makes all the difference,

165
00:09:55,853 --> 00:09:58,846
is really coming from the
company more than from the

166
00:09:58,846 --> 00:10:02,300
investor by and large. And our
focus is hopefully to provide

167
00:10:02,300 --> 00:10:05,811
them guidance on. how to think
about building their business.

168
00:10:05,811 --> 00:10:09,380
what are the right metrics to
track? How do you hire the right

169
00:10:09,380 --> 00:10:12,775
people? How do focus on the
right strategy to scale, things

170
00:10:12,775 --> 00:10:16,344
like that, which are a little
bit more, generic in a sense, as

171
00:10:16,344 --> 00:10:20,028
opposed to very specific to the
industry. so we certainly try to

172
00:10:20,028 --> 00:10:23,596
build expertise and, we want to
build expertise in industries,

173
00:10:23,596 --> 00:10:27,108
but, but I would say that, at
the end of the day, it's really

174
00:10:27,108 --> 00:10:30,734
entrepreneurs that have the most
knowledge about the businesses

175
00:10:30,734 --> 00:10:32,000
that they're building.

176
00:10:32,000 --> 00:10:35,502
Audrow Nash: Yeah, very
interesting point so tell me so

177
00:10:35,502 --> 00:10:39,386
you said that you first Or did,
was it you when you got first

178
00:10:39,386 --> 00:10:43,142
involved where you were doing
autonomous vehicles? Was that

179
00:10:43,142 --> 00:10:46,899
your kind of first foray into
investing in robotics? Or how

180
00:10:46,899 --> 00:10:49,000
long have you been involved?
and,

181
00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:52,693
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, when I
first joined F-Prime, we were

182
00:10:52,693 --> 00:10:56,198
not looking at autonomous
vehicles, I would say. I think

183
00:10:56,198 --> 00:10:59,703
this has been maybe going on
four or five years now that

184
00:10:59,703 --> 00:11:03,584
we've spent, we've spent looking
at, in the, just generally in

185
00:11:03,584 --> 00:11:07,340
the robotics and autonomy space.
prior to that, I spent time

186
00:11:07,340 --> 00:11:10,908
looking at other areas of
enterprise software. So there's

187
00:11:10,908 --> 00:11:14,350
a number of companies I'm
involved in that, Martech or,

188
00:11:14,350 --> 00:11:18,231
this company in the insurance
space, so a few different areas,

189
00:11:18,231 --> 00:11:21,987
but over time, I gravitated
towards this again, given my own

190
00:11:21,987 --> 00:11:25,930
personal background, I found it
to be particularly exciting and

191
00:11:25,930 --> 00:11:29,873
hopefully, something that I have
some at least unique expertise

192
00:11:29,873 --> 00:11:31,000
and experience in.

193
00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:37,050
Audrow Nash: Okay. And tell me
about pivoting from autonomous

194
00:11:37,050 --> 00:11:43,000
vehicles more towards industrial
and manufacturing robotics.

195
00:11:43,000 --> 00:11:46,642
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I would
say that, I think the more we

196
00:11:46,642 --> 00:11:50,284
spent time in the autonomous
vehicle space, the more I think

197
00:11:50,284 --> 00:11:53,562
we realized that, a couple of
different things, and it

198
00:11:53,562 --> 00:11:57,144
informed our own investment
philosophy in many ways. number

199
00:11:57,144 --> 00:12:00,118
one, these are pretty hard
problems to solve. And

200
00:12:00,118 --> 00:12:03,942
obviously, that has been borne
out, over the last few years is,

201
00:12:03,942 --> 00:12:07,827
as companies that have shut down
or faced a lot of challenges or

202
00:12:07,827 --> 00:12:11,288
just missed, missed projections
on when they're going to,

203
00:12:11,288 --> 00:12:14,808
release their products, et
cetera. So I think, the more we

204
00:12:14,808 --> 00:12:18,329
spend time, the more we realize,
okay, these are unbounded

205
00:12:18,329 --> 00:12:22,032
problems, which makes, which
makes predictability of, hitting

206
00:12:22,032 --> 00:12:25,188
any kind of commercial
milestones quite, quite hard.

207
00:12:25,188 --> 00:12:28,891
and related to that, then it's
like the capital that you need

208
00:12:28,891 --> 00:12:32,230
starts to become, really
unbounded. And I think we were

209
00:12:32,230 --> 00:12:35,933
not like, our goal was not to
invest, hundreds of millions of

210
00:12:35,933 --> 00:12:39,575
dollars in these companies. And
there's obviously some firms

211
00:12:39,575 --> 00:12:43,339
that, are able to do that and
have done that, but that was not

212
00:12:43,339 --> 00:12:46,920
our, our strategy, or even our
capability at the end of the

213
00:12:46,920 --> 00:12:50,441
day. And so as there was an
early wave of lots and lots of

214
00:12:50,441 --> 00:12:54,204
startups. I think that quickly
started to consolidate across a

215
00:12:54,204 --> 00:12:58,089
few market leaders. and, and as
that was happening, we realized,

216
00:12:58,089 --> 00:13:01,489
okay, we're probably You know,
we don't have the capital

217
00:13:01,489 --> 00:13:04,949
capability to put that kind of
money in, nor is it really

218
00:13:04,949 --> 00:13:08,105
strategically where we want to
focus, just given the

219
00:13:08,105 --> 00:13:11,323
uncertainty about, actually
getting to market. and we

220
00:13:11,323 --> 00:13:15,026
leveraged some of those skills
and knowledge and actually the

221
00:13:15,026 --> 00:13:18,971
work that I had done in my early
career was around manufacturing.

222
00:13:18,971 --> 00:13:22,128
and so I had a, my own
understanding or appreciation

223
00:13:22,128 --> 00:13:25,891
for what that took. and so then
we thought, okay, why don't we

224
00:13:25,891 --> 00:13:29,473
leverage what we've learned
about these newer generation of

225
00:13:29,473 --> 00:13:32,508
companies and start
investigating other areas, and

226
00:13:32,508 --> 00:13:36,089
so there's a whole range of,
logistics as a notable example

227
00:13:36,089 --> 00:13:39,914
that we spent a bunch of time in
and we have an investment in a

228
00:13:39,914 --> 00:13:43,374
company called RightHand
Robotics in that space, but it's

229
00:13:43,374 --> 00:13:47,077
a good example of industrial, an
industrial robotics, company

230
00:13:47,077 --> 00:13:50,719
that, that you know, that we
spent a lot of time starting to

231
00:13:50,719 --> 00:13:54,118
explore. And then, within that,
there are many different

232
00:13:54,118 --> 00:13:56,000
industries that you can target.

233
00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:01,145
Audrow Nash: How did you start,
deciding on which vertical or

234
00:14:01,145 --> 00:14:06,205
which, domains to invest in?
Logistics, manufacturing, maybe

235
00:14:06,205 --> 00:14:11,265
agriculture, these kinds of
things, they seem very promising

236
00:14:11,265 --> 00:14:16,578
to me, but how, did you select
from them as opposed to anything

237
00:14:16,578 --> 00:14:17,000
else?

238
00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:20,466
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I would
say, again, it was a little

239
00:14:20,466 --> 00:14:24,170
opportunistic in the sense that
in Boston, there's a very good

240
00:14:24,170 --> 00:14:27,934
ecosystem of companies focusing
on the logistics space. I think

241
00:14:27,934 --> 00:14:31,639
that was, has been born a little
bit out of, Kiva, having been

242
00:14:31,639 --> 00:14:35,344
based in Boston, and then from
Kiva, there were various people

243
00:14:35,344 --> 00:14:38,451
that kind of spun out and
launched companies. In the

244
00:14:38,451 --> 00:14:42,095
logistics space, a little bit
was, we're based in Boston. And

245
00:14:42,095 --> 00:14:45,561
so there are a lot of local
companies that were focused in

246
00:14:45,561 --> 00:14:49,086
that area. and so it was a
natural starting place, combined

247
00:14:49,086 --> 00:14:52,552
with the fact that I think the,
the market opportunity and

248
00:14:52,552 --> 00:14:56,137
logistics is quite appealing. if
you even look at investment

249
00:14:56,137 --> 00:14:59,244
numbers today, it's probably
the, one of the biggest

250
00:14:59,244 --> 00:15:02,411
categories of robotics
investment just because of the

251
00:15:02,411 --> 00:15:05,697
sheer demand for, from e
commerce and the like, that is

252
00:15:05,697 --> 00:15:09,103
driving a lot of robotic
solutions and also Amazon, being

253
00:15:09,103 --> 00:15:12,688
the, the, the bellwether for
what other people are trying to

254
00:15:12,688 --> 00:15:16,452
emulate, being very, aggressive
in robotics. So I think that it

255
00:15:16,452 --> 00:15:19,858
just was a natural starting
place, partly just because we

256
00:15:19,858 --> 00:15:23,383
were in Boston and there were a
lot of companies, and so we

257
00:15:23,383 --> 00:15:27,207
started there and then over time
started to, expand into looking

258
00:15:27,207 --> 00:15:29,000
at other, other areas as well.

259
00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:33,458
Audrow Nash: Okay. do you wanna,
I would love to hear about some

260
00:15:33,458 --> 00:15:37,358
of the robotics companies that
you are invested in, your

261
00:15:37,358 --> 00:15:41,816
portfolio. wanna give me just a
short description of each of, or

262
00:15:41,816 --> 00:15:43,000
of a few of them?

263
00:15:43,000 --> 00:15:46,346
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah,
absolutely. so one of the first

264
00:15:46,346 --> 00:15:50,313
investments we made is, was from
the time we were looking at the

265
00:15:50,313 --> 00:15:53,907
autonomous vehicle space, which
is in a LIDAR company. the

266
00:15:53,907 --> 00:15:57,377
company is called, it used to be
called InnoVuzion. They

267
00:15:57,377 --> 00:16:01,095
rebranded as Ceyond. really
interesting company. the founder

268
00:16:01,095 --> 00:16:04,256
had been, working on, LiDAR
systems at a variety of

269
00:16:04,256 --> 00:16:07,664
companies and had his own
perspective on what the, what

270
00:16:07,664 --> 00:16:11,383
the enabling technology should
be, what the right technology

271
00:16:11,383 --> 00:16:14,667
strategy should be for, for
LiDAR, because one of the

272
00:16:14,667 --> 00:16:17,890
challenges in LiDAR is that
there are many different

273
00:16:17,890 --> 00:16:21,546
approaches that people are
taking, from the spinning LiDAR,

274
00:16:21,546 --> 00:16:25,202
which was the early days of
Velodyne to other people trying

275
00:16:25,202 --> 00:16:28,858
to do solid state and, other
approaches. yeah. And that was

276
00:16:28,858 --> 00:16:32,824
one of the first investments we
made. one of the reasons that we

277
00:16:32,824 --> 00:16:36,853
made the investment actually was
that, they had already been in a

278
00:16:36,853 --> 00:16:40,385
sense vetted by NIO Auto in
China. they had looked at the

279
00:16:40,385 --> 00:16:43,855
market and identified, they
thought this was the company

280
00:16:43,855 --> 00:16:47,450
that they would partner with,
ultimately. It took a little

281
00:16:47,450 --> 00:16:51,106
while for that partnership to,
to take off, today, although

282
00:16:51,106 --> 00:16:54,824
it's not super well known in
the, US although they are based

283
00:16:54,824 --> 00:16:58,790
in California. They're actually
standard on every single NIO car

284
00:16:58,790 --> 00:17:02,137
that, is sold in China. So
they've literally produced,

285
00:17:02,137 --> 00:17:05,793
hundreds of thousands of, LiDAR
today, and have done really

286
00:17:05,793 --> 00:17:09,139
well. But, like the LiDAR
market, as you, if the LiDAR

287
00:17:09,139 --> 00:17:12,858
market is, a pretty challenging
market. There've been, there

288
00:17:12,858 --> 00:17:16,700
were a lot of companies that,
that were launched. not, many of

289
00:17:16,700 --> 00:17:20,046
them have promises of OEM
contracts, et cetera. Others

290
00:17:20,046 --> 00:17:23,950
never got there. but, It takes a
lot of money to actually build

291
00:17:23,950 --> 00:17:27,483
an automotive grade sensor.
these guys, partly because of

292
00:17:27,483 --> 00:17:31,511
their NIO partnership have, been
able to successfully get to that

293
00:17:31,511 --> 00:17:35,291
point. again, as I said, as we
got deeper into the market, we

294
00:17:35,291 --> 00:17:39,071
were really excited about our
investment there. but over time

295
00:17:39,071 --> 00:17:42,789
just realized the capital needs
for companies like that were

296
00:17:42,789 --> 00:17:46,384
such that we. Then we started
focusing on logistics in the

297
00:17:46,384 --> 00:17:49,854
first place. we ended up
investing in RightHand Robotics

298
00:17:49,854 --> 00:17:53,882
here in Boston. they make, piece
picking for, for e commerce. And

299
00:17:53,882 --> 00:17:57,229
so if you look, if in the
logistics space, there are a

300
00:17:57,229 --> 00:18:01,133
bunch of different people making
different kinds of robotic arm

301
00:18:01,133 --> 00:18:04,603
solutions for different use
cases. Some are doing parcel

302
00:18:04,603 --> 00:18:08,321
handling, for example, others
are doing, piece-picking, even

303
00:18:08,321 --> 00:18:12,288
within piece-picking, there are
different companies, focused on,

304
00:18:12,288 --> 00:18:16,130
let's say, food or clothing or
just, general e commerce goods.

305
00:18:16,130 --> 00:18:19,786
so RightHand is focused on the,
last, so they, for example,

306
00:18:19,786 --> 00:18:23,504
recently announced a partnership
with Staples, where they're

307
00:18:23,504 --> 00:18:24,000
going to

308
00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:25,000
Audrow Nash: Oh, cool.

309
00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:26,000
Sanjay Aggarwal: the

310
00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:26,000
Audrow Nash: Good for them.

311
00:18:26,000 --> 00:18:29,618
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, really,
impressive accomplishment, by

312
00:18:29,618 --> 00:18:33,236
them, and anyway, that was a
good example of a company that,

313
00:18:33,236 --> 00:18:36,553
really impressive technical
founders, it's taken them a

314
00:18:36,553 --> 00:18:39,930
while to really perfect the
solution, just given, again,

315
00:18:39,930 --> 00:18:43,307
it's a pretty hard problem to
solve, you, because it's a

316
00:18:43,307 --> 00:18:47,045
problem you can't solve at the
80 percent or 90 percent level,

317
00:18:47,045 --> 00:18:50,000
you got to solve it at like the
99 percent level,

318
00:18:50,000 --> 00:18:52,000
Audrow Nash: or nine, a few
nines.

319
00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:54,719
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, so
getting to that last bit takes a

320
00:18:54,719 --> 00:18:55,000
little

321
00:18:55,000 --> 00:18:57,000
Audrow Nash: Way longer. Yeah.

322
00:18:57,000 --> 00:19:01,425
Sanjay Aggarwal: but yeah,
they're a company that we've

323
00:19:01,425 --> 00:19:04,000
invested in the logistics space.

324
00:19:04,000 --> 00:19:07,644
Audrow Nash: Hell yeah. I really
like them. One of my, when back

325
00:19:07,644 --> 00:19:11,231
in the Robohub days, I think I
interviewed them quickly. and we

326
00:19:11,231 --> 00:19:14,477
hung out a lot at ICRA, the
robotics conference and there

327
00:19:14,477 --> 00:19:17,722
were a lot of fun people. I
really like them as a company

328
00:19:17,722 --> 00:19:20,000
and hope to catch up in the near
future.

329
00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:23,965
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, they had
the most amazing office. If you

330
00:19:23,965 --> 00:19:27,552
ever went to Boston, they used
to, they used to occupy an

331
00:19:27,552 --> 00:19:29,000
abandoned UPS facility,

332
00:19:29,000 --> 00:19:30,000
Audrow Nash: Ah,

333
00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:33,758
Sanjay Aggarwal: It was quite,
quite the cool office that they

334
00:19:33,758 --> 00:19:34,000
had.

335
00:19:34,000 --> 00:19:35,000
Audrow Nash: Hell yeah.

336
00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:38,278
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, then we
have a couple of other

337
00:19:38,278 --> 00:19:42,052
investments. One's a company
called Burrow in the agriculture

338
00:19:42,052 --> 00:19:45,763
space. So they make a small
autonomous vehicle to help move.

339
00:19:45,763 --> 00:19:48,608
Goods in either outdoor or
indoor agricultural

340
00:19:48,608 --> 00:19:52,258
environments. And then the last
company is a company called

341
00:19:52,258 --> 00:19:56,216
Taleo, which is a hybrid, remote
operation, an autonomy solution

342
00:19:56,216 --> 00:19:59,000
focused on construction and
mining use cases.

343
00:19:59,000 --> 00:20:02,393
Audrow Nash: Yeah, both very
exciting. Burrow, it looks

344
00:20:02,393 --> 00:20:05,971
really cool. I'm very excited
about the agriculture space.

345
00:20:05,971 --> 00:20:09,672
Actually, the mining space is
very interesting too. I, those

346
00:20:09,672 --> 00:20:13,373
seem like very good tasks for
robots to me, just, to helping

347
00:20:13,373 --> 00:20:17,075
out there. And Burrow, it's,
funny, it's like donkey, right?

348
00:20:17,075 --> 00:20:18,000
Doesn't, and so

349
00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:21,319
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I'm sure
that was the, the tongue in

350
00:20:21,319 --> 00:20:24,806
cheek kind of inspiration for
the name. but yeah, there's been

351
00:20:24,806 --> 00:20:27,788
a, there's been a fair number of
companies focused on

352
00:20:27,788 --> 00:20:31,275
agriculture, and we spent a lot
of time, meeting many of those

353
00:20:31,275 --> 00:20:34,650
companies. Many of them are
focused on harvesting itself, So

354
00:20:34,650 --> 00:20:36,000
actually, picking crops,

355
00:20:36,000 --> 00:20:38,000
Audrow Nash: Oh, that's super
hard. Okay.

356
00:20:38,000 --> 00:20:40,818
Sanjay Aggarwal: but I, yeah, I
think we concluded that's just

357
00:20:40,818 --> 00:20:43,409
hard, It was hard enough in
RightHand Robotics case in an

358
00:20:43,409 --> 00:20:46,000
indoor environment. You could
get an outdoor environment,

359
00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:47,000
Audrow Nash: Sun and dust.

360
00:20:47,000 --> 00:20:50,985
Sanjay Aggarwal: And it's up and
down a row, like really hard. I

361
00:20:50,985 --> 00:20:54,658
think several companies have
started to crack it, but, it's

362
00:20:54,658 --> 00:20:58,580
taken a little bit of time. But
I think we like the kind of the

363
00:20:58,580 --> 00:21:02,192
simplicity of what Burrow was
building. And it was also, I

364
00:21:02,192 --> 00:21:06,176
think, in some ways, I feel like
it was a It's emblematic of the

365
00:21:06,176 --> 00:21:09,725
new crop of robotics founders
that we see today, which is

366
00:21:09,725 --> 00:21:13,648
that, Charlie, the founder of,
of, Burrow was actually a farmer

367
00:21:13,648 --> 00:21:17,196
growing up, so he deeply
understood, the, needs and could

368
00:21:17,196 --> 00:21:20,994
really identify with, with the
potential customers. And so he

369
00:21:20,994 --> 00:21:24,668
is very pragmatic and trying to
build a solution that, that

370
00:21:24,668 --> 00:21:28,403
work, that could be quickly
deployed, that, delivered value,

371
00:21:28,403 --> 00:21:32,139
very, in a very short period of
time. and I think that, that

372
00:21:32,139 --> 00:21:35,625
kind of ethos was really what
enabled them to, to get to

373
00:21:35,625 --> 00:21:39,361
market pretty quickly with a
solution that's quite effective

374
00:21:39,361 --> 00:21:43,034
and was quite unique in the
market at the time. now there's

375
00:21:43,034 --> 00:21:46,459
starting to be some similar
players out there, but. but

376
00:21:46,459 --> 00:21:50,008
they've done really well. they
literally have hundreds of

377
00:21:50,008 --> 00:21:52,000
devices out in the field, today.

378
00:21:52,000 --> 00:21:56,456
Audrow Nash: Mhmm. Yeah, that's
so cool. when you say, the thing

379
00:21:56,456 --> 00:22:00,494
that struck my ears was, new
crop of founders. What do you

380
00:22:00,494 --> 00:22:03,000
feel like they're doing
differently?

381
00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:06,394
Sanjay Aggarwal: I think
there's, I think there are two

382
00:22:06,394 --> 00:22:10,282
or, there are a couple of things
that we see. so it, used to be

383
00:22:10,282 --> 00:22:13,922
that, prototypical robotics
founder was, they came out of a

384
00:22:13,922 --> 00:22:17,502
PhD program, had done robotics,
had, were very technically

385
00:22:17,502 --> 00:22:20,587
talented, but they were a
technology looking for a

386
00:22:20,587 --> 00:22:24,351
problem, in a sense. and. and I
think that, that proved to be

387
00:22:24,351 --> 00:22:28,177
difficult in some ways, right?
in the sense that it just takes

388
00:22:28,177 --> 00:22:32,188
a while to navigate yourself to,
yeah, what is the right problem?

389
00:22:32,188 --> 00:22:35,706
how do you, because now you have
to not only identify the

390
00:22:35,706 --> 00:22:39,655
problem, but also understand the
industry, understand how do you

391
00:22:39,655 --> 00:22:43,604
sell to that industry? There are
many kind of dimensions of what

392
00:22:43,604 --> 00:22:47,430
you have to solve. And, I think
the stereotype is that, you're

393
00:22:47,430 --> 00:22:50,701
almost too in love with the
technology, as opposed to

394
00:22:50,701 --> 00:22:53,910
solving a problem. And
obviously, that's not true in

395
00:22:53,910 --> 00:22:57,736
all cases, but, oftentimes, I
think, maybe there's a risk of a

396
00:22:57,736 --> 00:23:01,623
solution being over engineered
for a problem that you're trying

397
00:23:01,623 --> 00:23:05,449
to solve. I think there are two
things that we see differently

398
00:23:05,449 --> 00:23:09,337
today. number one, you see a lot
of, of people like Charlie, at

399
00:23:09,337 --> 00:23:13,286
Burrow who, they're, they, they,
have a deep, they start from an

400
00:23:13,286 --> 00:23:16,866
understanding of the industry.
that's their story. And the

401
00:23:16,866 --> 00:23:20,815
technology is a means to an end
as opposed to the, end in and of

402
00:23:20,815 --> 00:23:24,641
itself. And very pragmatic in
terms of, let's, build something

403
00:23:24,641 --> 00:23:28,282
that works, without trying to
solve everything. and I think

404
00:23:28,282 --> 00:23:32,108
that has proven to be in some
ways, maybe they don't build the

405
00:23:32,108 --> 00:23:35,687
most, technically amazing
problem, solution, which is, not

406
00:23:35,687 --> 00:23:39,019
to say it's not great.
technically strong, but they're

407
00:23:39,019 --> 00:23:42,660
not trying, they're not so in
love with the technology that

408
00:23:42,660 --> 00:23:46,301
they want to make something
that's, that's incredible. They

409
00:23:46,301 --> 00:23:50,003
want to, they're actually just
in love with the problem, and

410
00:23:50,003 --> 00:23:53,089
they're trying to solve the
problem. so that's one

411
00:23:53,089 --> 00:23:56,544
dimension. And I think the
second dimension, which is a,

412
00:23:56,544 --> 00:24:00,432
kind of a, actually a more, an
example of Taleo, which is that,

413
00:24:00,432 --> 00:24:04,258
there's a bunch of founders that
sort of cut their teeth on in

414
00:24:04,258 --> 00:24:08,207
the autonomous vehicle industry.
so they spent time there under,

415
00:24:08,207 --> 00:24:12,033
like understood number one, how
do you productionize, code for

416
00:24:12,033 --> 00:24:15,612
this, productionized solutions
in these industries. And so

417
00:24:15,612 --> 00:24:19,377
that, gives the, much faster
cycle times, but also again, are

418
00:24:19,377 --> 00:24:22,524
just more pragmatic, because
they, they did see the

419
00:24:22,524 --> 00:24:26,288
challenges of the autonomous
vehicle industry. and so I think

420
00:24:26,288 --> 00:24:30,176
they, tend to just. Attack the
problems in a more pragmatic way

421
00:24:30,176 --> 00:24:33,631
without trying to solve
everything. I think, again, very

422
00:24:33,631 --> 00:24:37,272
much informed by, the challenges
of launching a, autonomous

423
00:24:37,272 --> 00:24:39,000
vehicle for passenger roads.

424
00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:43,337
Audrow Nash: Definitely. I see
it like, robotics is really hard

425
00:24:43,337 --> 00:24:47,329
but it's becoming easier and so
now you're starting to see

426
00:24:47,329 --> 00:24:51,184
people that can come in with a
little bit less technical

427
00:24:51,184 --> 00:24:55,038
knowledge or no technical
knowledge and maybe get a good

428
00:24:55,038 --> 00:24:58,686
co founder that has that
technical knowledge and then

429
00:24:58,686 --> 00:25:02,748
they can actually start to
provide value especially if they

430
00:25:02,748 --> 00:25:06,602
stick to deeply pragmatic
solutions that often have tons

431
00:25:06,602 --> 00:25:10,663
of value, Just because they
weren't being done, or they can

432
00:25:10,663 --> 00:25:14,656
free up some hands to do some
other work, or anything like

433
00:25:14,656 --> 00:25:15,000
this.

434
00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:18,386
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah. Yeah. And
again, I think it, like it has

435
00:25:18,386 --> 00:25:20,911
to be born from a deep
understanding of, of the

436
00:25:20,911 --> 00:25:24,082
industry that you're serving,
right? Like only then can you

437
00:25:24,082 --> 00:25:27,414
envision, okay, what would be a
solution that would be helpful

438
00:25:27,414 --> 00:25:30,745
here? And to your point, yeah,
you don't, you can hire and you

439
00:25:30,745 --> 00:25:33,486
can find co founders or
engineers that can help you

440
00:25:33,486 --> 00:25:36,818
solve the problem, but it's got
to start with an understanding

441
00:25:36,818 --> 00:25:38,000
of the problem itself.

442
00:25:38,000 --> 00:25:42,333
Audrow Nash: Yeah. It's
interesting to me going from

443
00:25:42,333 --> 00:25:47,583
autonomous vehicles, just like
autonomous cars on the street to

444
00:25:47,583 --> 00:25:52,083
like Burrow, which is very
practical and a much easier

445
00:25:52,083 --> 00:25:57,167
problem. It's I feel like it's,
a nice thing for the robotics

446
00:25:57,167 --> 00:26:01,917
industry because we're going
from something that's really

447
00:26:01,917 --> 00:26:07,083
flashy and seems very big. and
when we solve it, it'll be just

448
00:26:07,083 --> 00:26:12,167
amazing. but very hard. And then
Burrow, which is. Very cool,

449
00:26:12,167 --> 00:26:16,917
very practical, probably has
strong ROI for the customers

450
00:26:16,917 --> 00:26:22,000
and, probably has less risk for
like less technical risk as a

451
00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:26,083
company, than autonomous
vehicles. So I like this

452
00:26:26,083 --> 00:26:28,000
trajectory in robotics.

453
00:26:28,000 --> 00:26:31,452
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, it's it's
the irony of robotics, I would

454
00:26:31,452 --> 00:26:32,000
say, which

455
00:26:32,000 --> 00:26:36,000
Audrow Nash: Tell me about it.

456
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,476
Sanjay Aggarwal: as, a,
consumer, as just your layman,

457
00:26:39,476 --> 00:26:43,661
so to speak, what are, oh, yeah,
people making humanoid robotics,

458
00:26:43,661 --> 00:26:47,459
or people making autonomous
vehicles, where, you you, never

459
00:26:47,459 --> 00:26:51,000
have to drive again. And those
are fantastic visions. I

460
00:26:51,000 --> 00:26:52,000
Audrow Nash: Oh yeah, all

461
00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:54,507
Sanjay Aggarwal: I, I find it,
like it's hard to imagine that

462
00:26:54,507 --> 00:26:55,000
those things

463
00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:59,733
Sanjay Aggarwal: won't exist
eventually, but but there's so

464
00:26:59,733 --> 00:27:04,786
much technical uncertainty that
it a little bit, it's not clear

465
00:27:04,786 --> 00:27:09,599
how it fits into the venture
capital market, right? it's one

466
00:27:09,599 --> 00:27:10,000
thing

467
00:27:10,000 --> 00:27:12,500
Audrow Nash: because it's
unbounded in a sense. Is that

468
00:27:12,500 --> 00:27:13,000
why or what

469
00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:16,333
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, from a
VC's perspective, like they're

470
00:27:16,333 --> 00:27:17,000
looking for,

471
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:19,000
Audrow Nash: Return on
investment.

472
00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:22,819
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, they're
looking for returns, which is

473
00:27:22,819 --> 00:27:26,575
driven by, the standard kind of,
framework, I guess is like

474
00:27:26,575 --> 00:27:30,012
you're hitting commercial
milestones at each point, at

475
00:27:30,012 --> 00:27:33,513
various points along the
trajectory of a business. Now,

476
00:27:33,513 --> 00:27:37,524
if it's, if you have to raise a
hundred million dollars to get,

477
00:27:37,524 --> 00:27:40,897
to any kind of material
commercial proof point, okay,

478
00:27:40,897 --> 00:27:44,844
that's, that is not the typical
venture capital. you have this

479
00:27:44,844 --> 00:27:48,727
kind of big vision around, okay,
yeah, there's all these cool

480
00:27:48,727 --> 00:27:52,228
technology that you could build,
but, it may just be so

481
00:27:52,228 --> 00:27:56,047
challenging that you don't,
like, how do you marry that with

482
00:27:56,047 --> 00:27:59,867
the ability to actually hit some
kind of, proof, like market

483
00:27:59,867 --> 00:28:03,240
proof points in some way.
bounded time with a bounded

484
00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:07,314
amount of capital, right? And so
I think the pragmatism of what,

485
00:28:07,314 --> 00:28:11,006
what you see a lot of today in
robotics is driven by that,

486
00:28:11,006 --> 00:28:14,825
which is, hey, it may not seem
the, visions that people have

487
00:28:14,825 --> 00:28:18,581
about what robotics are, but
they're actually solving very,

488
00:28:18,581 --> 00:28:21,000
very real and very practical
problems.

489
00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:25,667
Audrow Nash: Now, you brought it
up with the humanoids. What do

490
00:28:25,667 --> 00:28:29,444
you think of a lot of the
interest in humanoids? In

491
00:28:29,444 --> 00:28:31,000
humanoids in general?

492
00:28:31,000 --> 00:28:34,208
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, again,
I've met a couple of the

493
00:28:34,208 --> 00:28:37,000
companies and, it's pretty, it's
quite amazing,

494
00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:38,000
Audrow Nash: Oh, definitely.

495
00:28:38,000 --> 00:28:42,429
Sanjay Aggarwal: building, And I
was very favorably impressed,

496
00:28:42,429 --> 00:28:47,000
with what, with what I heard and
what I saw. again, I think the,

497
00:28:47,000 --> 00:28:51,429
question is to, there, there's
always investors that are ready

498
00:28:51,429 --> 00:28:55,571
to make investments in these
kind of big, home run type of

499
00:28:55,571 --> 00:28:59,857
opportunities. and you've seen,
I think Figure, for example,

500
00:28:59,857 --> 00:29:04,071
announced an investment from
OpenAI, for example. or Tesla,

501
00:29:04,071 --> 00:29:08,429
investing in, in their robot.
and like with Tesla, okay, like

502
00:29:08,429 --> 00:29:12,714
it's different. Like I think
their, math of, okay, is this a

503
00:29:12,714 --> 00:29:16,857
worthwhile investment? It's a
little bit different than an

504
00:29:16,857 --> 00:29:18,000
investor because

505
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:19,000
Audrow Nash: Oh.

506
00:29:19,000 --> 00:29:22,825
Sanjay Aggarwal: they're their
own captive customer, for

507
00:29:22,825 --> 00:29:27,128
example, right? they don't have
an unlimited amount of capital,

508
00:29:27,128 --> 00:29:30,885
but they have, their, goal of
ROI, so to speak, is not,

509
00:29:30,885 --> 00:29:34,846
necessarily, as, they can think
in a much longer term way,

510
00:29:34,846 --> 00:29:38,944
perhaps, than, your typical
investor can. And so when I look

511
00:29:38,944 --> 00:29:42,633
at humanoids, I think the
question that I have is that

512
00:29:42,633 --> 00:29:46,867
it's hard not to imagine that
they will exist at some point in

513
00:29:46,867 --> 00:29:51,102
the future. what's less clear to
me is will they exist, in any

514
00:29:51,102 --> 00:29:54,927
material way, in material way,
just meaning, in terms of

515
00:29:54,927 --> 00:29:58,957
practical applications that are
in the market, solving real

516
00:29:58,957 --> 00:30:03,397
problems. And, In five years, 10
years or 50 years, right? And so

517
00:30:03,397 --> 00:30:07,426
as an investor, it becomes, it's
a, sort of a hard place to

518
00:30:07,426 --> 00:30:11,593
invest in, I believe, unless
your, time horizon is, it's much

519
00:30:11,593 --> 00:30:16,032
longer or much more flexible, to
do that. And so again, like you,

520
00:30:16,032 --> 00:30:20,062
you see these videos that people
release and they're pretty

521
00:30:20,062 --> 00:30:24,024
amazing, right? like hard to
imagine like what people have

522
00:30:24,024 --> 00:30:27,781
created, but, but the, but
making those systems do real

523
00:30:27,781 --> 00:30:32,220
world things, I think is still a
little bit of a ways off and you

524
00:30:32,220 --> 00:30:36,523
starting to hear some Agility,
for example, had, announced like

525
00:30:36,523 --> 00:30:40,621
some initial pilot at Amazon
warehouses, for example. And it

526
00:30:40,621 --> 00:30:44,856
may be closer than I think, in
some cases, but, I think again,

527
00:30:44,856 --> 00:30:49,227
like my guess is that those near
term use cases will be narrowly

528
00:30:49,227 --> 00:30:53,531
defined, very, not, the vision
that one imagines of a humanoid,

529
00:30:53,531 --> 00:30:57,424
but actually pretty, fairly,
constrained, use cases to be

530
00:30:57,424 --> 00:31:01,317
able to, to achieve, some,
again, some kind of commercial

531
00:31:01,317 --> 00:31:02,000
milestone.

532
00:31:02,000 --> 00:31:06,035
Audrow Nash: yeah. Yeah. I
talked to Melonee, about their

533
00:31:06,035 --> 00:31:10,071
humanoid from Agility and it
sounds like they have pretty

534
00:31:10,071 --> 00:31:14,177
good market fit with that.
there's a, they, provide ROI in

535
00:31:14,177 --> 00:31:18,425
a reasonable timeframe, but
you're probably right that it is

536
00:31:18,425 --> 00:31:22,460
narrow in terms of, actual
application, and like it won't

537
00:31:22,460 --> 00:31:26,000
be just doing everything in your
house super soon.

538
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:29,652
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, just as
an example, like they don't have

539
00:31:29,652 --> 00:31:33,420
an artic they don't have a hand,
in Agility's case, right? I mean

540
00:31:33,420 --> 00:31:36,957
they, yeah, they don't have,
they're not trying to articulate

541
00:31:36,957 --> 00:31:39,971
finger, fingers, and so that's
one way that they've,

542
00:31:39,971 --> 00:31:43,159
significantly simplify the
problem, right? I think what

543
00:31:43,159 --> 00:31:46,754
they are doing is they have a
very specific use case that they

544
00:31:46,754 --> 00:31:50,406
do, which by itself is not easy,
right? But again, like they're

545
00:31:50,406 --> 00:31:54,000
pursuing one use case, they're
not trying to do, a hundred use

546
00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:57,536
cases, right? And I think again,
like the, path to rollout is

547
00:31:57,536 --> 00:32:01,130
probably going to be look like
more like that than again, what

548
00:32:01,130 --> 00:32:04,609
one might, envision in their
mind. but yeah, I think it's an

549
00:32:04,609 --> 00:32:08,203
interesting and exciting space,
one, it's very hard to predict

550
00:32:08,203 --> 00:32:10,000
how it's going to play out. all

551
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:14,497
Audrow Nash: heard, so I host
spaces and we talked about

552
00:32:14,497 --> 00:32:19,477
humanoids many times, but one of
the interesting ideas was the

553
00:32:19,477 --> 00:32:23,894
reason, because a lot of
investors have really piled on

554
00:32:23,894 --> 00:32:28,793
for humanoids in my, from my
perspective, maybe that's wrong,

555
00:32:28,793 --> 00:32:33,531
but from that appearance, a
perspective of someone else was

556
00:32:33,531 --> 00:32:38,671
that the reason is because with
humanoids, with the promise that

557
00:32:38,671 --> 00:32:41,000
they can go do general tasks,

558
00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:42,000
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yep.

559
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:45,240
Audrow Nash: there is a
potential for a much bigger

560
00:32:45,240 --> 00:32:49,178
return on investment for this
kind of thing. Like their, point

561
00:32:49,178 --> 00:32:53,180
was that most robotics companies
have pretty narrow markets and

562
00:32:53,180 --> 00:32:56,800
therefore you don't see a
hundred times return. You see a

563
00:32:56,800 --> 00:33:00,802
10 times or 10 times return. 20
times return, especially if you

564
00:33:00,802 --> 00:33:04,169
invest a bit later in the
company, but with this, the

565
00:33:04,169 --> 00:33:07,917
market is enormous because it
could just do all like manual

566
00:33:07,917 --> 00:33:11,855
tasks in a sense. what do you
think of that perspective? And I

567
00:33:11,855 --> 00:33:15,857
guess it probably comes down to
timeline, but what's your, what

568
00:33:15,857 --> 00:33:17,000
are your thoughts?

569
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:20,480
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I think
timeline and capital, right?

570
00:33:20,480 --> 00:33:24,137
yeah, the concept, yeah, what
you said is, hard to debate. the

571
00:33:24,137 --> 00:33:27,794
question is how much money does
it take and how much time does

572
00:33:27,794 --> 00:33:31,273
it take to achieve it, right?
Because if you just wanted to

573
00:33:31,273 --> 00:33:34,694
move in, again, I'm no expert on
Agility, generally what I

574
00:33:34,694 --> 00:33:38,115
understand is they're moving
totes from kind of point A to

575
00:33:38,115 --> 00:33:39,000
point B, right?

576
00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:40,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah. That's

577
00:33:40,000 --> 00:33:43,424
Sanjay Aggarwal: I am sure that
you can build a robotic arm

578
00:33:43,424 --> 00:33:46,732
solution or some other solution
to do that specific task,

579
00:33:46,732 --> 00:33:49,924
probably in a, equally
efficient, probably less capital

580
00:33:49,924 --> 00:33:53,000
intensive way, but it would be a
single use solution.

581
00:33:53,000 --> 00:33:54,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah.

582
00:33:54,000 --> 00:33:57,168
Sanjay Aggarwal: And so as you
try to build generalizability

583
00:33:57,168 --> 00:34:00,601
into many different tasks, yeah,
that's great. But again, does it

584
00:34:00,601 --> 00:34:03,980
take, how long does it take and
how much time does it get to get

585
00:34:03,980 --> 00:34:07,201
there? And do you just run out
of steam before you get there?

586
00:34:07,201 --> 00:34:10,475
And again, in some ways, like
that's the, that's what happened

587
00:34:10,475 --> 00:34:13,644
to the autonomous vehicle space,
which is that. like some of

588
00:34:13,644 --> 00:34:16,706
these companies have raised
billions of dollars literally,

589
00:34:16,706 --> 00:34:19,769
right? You know with the same
print premise, which is that

590
00:34:19,769 --> 00:34:22,990
okay. Yeah, if you can build a
generalized autonomous vehicle

591
00:34:22,990 --> 00:34:26,000
Like okay, there's this massive
TAM, but you know at some

592
00:34:26,000 --> 00:34:27,000
Audrow Nash: What's TAM?

593
00:34:27,000 --> 00:34:30,546
Sanjay Aggarwal: like just a
addressable market, you know is

594
00:34:30,546 --> 00:34:34,152
is massive but But you know now
you look at it and okay, it's

595
00:34:34,152 --> 00:34:37,816
been you know people miss their
deadline, over and over again,

596
00:34:37,816 --> 00:34:41,422
like you're all the negative
press with Cruz and Waymo and so

597
00:34:41,422 --> 00:34:44,791
forth. And it's okay, you
wonder, people may just run out

598
00:34:44,791 --> 00:34:48,396
of patience, right? And people
and the money may run out, and

599
00:34:48,396 --> 00:34:52,179
so you never get there. And so I
think that's the potential risk

600
00:34:52,179 --> 00:34:56,021
with humanoids. I don't, I don't
know if that's what will happen,

601
00:34:56,021 --> 00:34:59,744
there, but, again, like if you
can build it, fantastic. But, do

602
00:34:59,744 --> 00:35:03,527
you, can you actually get to the
finish line is question mark in

603
00:35:03,527 --> 00:35:04,000
my mind.

604
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:08,677
Audrow Nash: Gotcha. Now, you
have, segwaying a little bit,

605
00:35:08,677 --> 00:35:13,591
you have worked, or, F-Prime has
worked on a State of Robotics

606
00:35:13,591 --> 00:35:17,000
report. would you tell me a bit
about that?

607
00:35:17,000 --> 00:35:20,396
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah,
absolutely. I would say that as

608
00:35:20,396 --> 00:35:23,980
we started spending more and
more time on the industry, I

609
00:35:23,980 --> 00:35:28,068
think one of the, things that we
realized is that it's not a well

610
00:35:28,068 --> 00:35:31,904
covered industry, right? the
data that exists for robotics as

611
00:35:31,904 --> 00:35:35,426
an industry, Is, is spotty at
best. so it's hard to know

612
00:35:35,426 --> 00:35:39,387
what's actually happening and,
as an investor, or even as a, as

613
00:35:39,387 --> 00:35:43,286
an entrepreneur, for example,
like it's helpful to understand,

614
00:35:43,286 --> 00:35:47,248
okay, how many, how much money
is being raised into this space?

615
00:35:47,248 --> 00:35:51,147
What are the hot sectors? what
are, who are the investors, all

616
00:35:51,147 --> 00:35:54,731
sorts of, these kinds of
dynamics to help inform your own

617
00:35:54,731 --> 00:35:58,630
thinking, about how to, approach
the market. and as we started

618
00:35:58,630 --> 00:36:02,026
digging in more and more, we
realized that part of the

619
00:36:02,026 --> 00:36:05,925
problem is that. the industry
itself is not well defined. what

620
00:36:05,925 --> 00:36:09,887
is robotics actually? And so we
undertook a task, starting last

621
00:36:09,887 --> 00:36:13,597
year to really do a bottoms up,
analysis. literally we went

622
00:36:13,597 --> 00:36:16,993
through thousands of deals to
figure out like, what is

623
00:36:16,993 --> 00:36:20,955
robotics, what's not robotics,
and then create our own taxonomy

624
00:36:20,955 --> 00:36:24,791
in a sense, around different
categories. And then use that as

625
00:36:24,791 --> 00:36:28,250
the basis for then actually
creating a little bit more.

626
00:36:28,250 --> 00:36:32,337
comprehensive and accurate, view
of the market. And with that, we

627
00:36:32,337 --> 00:36:36,236
published the first one about a
year ago. We're working on the

628
00:36:36,236 --> 00:36:40,009
second, the second report now.
and we, we created a taxonomy

629
00:36:40,009 --> 00:36:44,034
and really, created what we call
three different categories. one

630
00:36:44,034 --> 00:36:47,744
is AV, autonomous vehicles.
really focused on passenger, or

631
00:36:47,744 --> 00:36:51,266
I'm sorry, on public road use
cases. So things like what

632
00:36:51,266 --> 00:36:55,039
cruise is doing, but there's
also trucking, for example, on,

633
00:36:55,039 --> 00:36:58,749
on public roads, the second is a
term that we coined called

634
00:36:58,749 --> 00:37:02,459
vertical robotics, which is,
just, really industrial robots

635
00:37:02,459 --> 00:37:05,981
that are focused on very
specific vertical use cases, so

636
00:37:05,981 --> 00:37:09,691
something like RightHand on,
logistics or Burrow focused on

637
00:37:09,691 --> 00:37:13,087
agriculture, but they're really
trying to solve a very

638
00:37:13,087 --> 00:37:16,797
particular use case. and the
third is what we call enabling

639
00:37:16,797 --> 00:37:20,382
systems. So these are people
building new sensors or new,

640
00:37:20,382 --> 00:37:24,092
testing, software tools for
testing, or a lot of people are

641
00:37:24,092 --> 00:37:27,928
building, development platforms
for robotics. So they're not,

642
00:37:27,928 --> 00:37:31,701
building an end to end system,
but they are building tooling

643
00:37:31,701 --> 00:37:34,846
and systems that help,
hopefully, enable, The next

644
00:37:34,846 --> 00:37:38,807
generation of robotics companies
to, to, be more productive, to

645
00:37:38,807 --> 00:37:42,455
do things more efficiently, et
cetera. so anyway, it was a

646
00:37:42,455 --> 00:37:45,788
really interesting process. I
think we learned a lot.

647
00:37:45,788 --> 00:37:49,184
hopefully the, the investor
community and entrepreneur

648
00:37:49,184 --> 00:37:52,894
community found it, found it
useful. And, and again, we'll,

649
00:37:52,894 --> 00:37:56,478
keep publishing, our analysis
just to help, help everyone

650
00:37:56,478 --> 00:38:00,000
understand, like what's really
happening, in the market.

651
00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:03,735
Audrow Nash: and what are you
finding? what have been some of

652
00:38:03,735 --> 00:38:06,000
the larger takeaways from the
report?

653
00:38:06,000 --> 00:38:09,753
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, I would
say, one is, the market's pretty

654
00:38:09,753 --> 00:38:13,149
decent size, if you look at the
last, call it five years,

655
00:38:13,149 --> 00:38:16,664
there's been almost a hundred
billion dollars, invested in,

656
00:38:16,664 --> 00:38:20,000
the broadly defined robotics
categories, as I described,

657
00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:22,905
Audrow Nash: how much at each?
Because I'm curious if most of

658
00:38:22,905 --> 00:38:25,000
that gets eaten up by autonomous
vehicles or

659
00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:28,712
Sanjay Aggarwal: so that's, that
was one of the big trends that's

660
00:38:28,712 --> 00:38:32,423
happened. that was in some ways,
that was the spark, if you will,

661
00:38:32,423 --> 00:38:35,621
for the excitement in the
category. so if you look back,

662
00:38:35,621 --> 00:38:39,104
four or five years ago, I think
it was like 70, 80 percent of

663
00:38:39,104 --> 00:38:42,416
the funds were going into
autonomous vehicles. And this is

664
00:38:42,416 --> 00:38:45,842
when, the Cruises of the world
were raising billion, billion

665
00:38:45,842 --> 00:38:49,496
dollar rounds, there was quite a
lot of money going in, but over

666
00:38:49,496 --> 00:38:52,751
the last few years, like the
autonomous vehicle market is

667
00:38:52,751 --> 00:38:56,234
starting to, really retrench it,
certainly from an investment

668
00:38:56,234 --> 00:38:59,660
perspective. I think it peaked
at something like. 10 billion

669
00:38:59,660 --> 00:39:03,086
ish a year. last year it was
close to two, right? So really,

670
00:39:03,086 --> 00:39:04,000
strong pullback.

671
00:39:04,000 --> 00:39:06,000
Audrow Nash: That is

672
00:39:06,000 --> 00:39:09,885
Sanjay Aggarwal: and then in its
place, this vertical robotics,

673
00:39:09,885 --> 00:39:13,461
categories I described has
really started to take over and

674
00:39:13,461 --> 00:39:16,606
is now the majority of
investment, is from vertical

675
00:39:16,606 --> 00:39:20,429
robotics. again, logistics, and
there's a lot going in defense

676
00:39:20,429 --> 00:39:24,375
and medical robotics. so that's,
been the, shifting mix of where

677
00:39:24,375 --> 00:39:28,075
the investor dollars are going.
and then there's a, just the

678
00:39:28,075 --> 00:39:29,000
macro headwind,

679
00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:36,203
Sanjay Aggarwal: I would say, in
the venture community in

680
00:39:36,203 --> 00:39:41,890
general, which is like
investment dollars are

681
00:39:41,890 --> 00:39:49,220
obviously, declining, pretty
rapidly, certainly off of the

682
00:39:49,220 --> 00:39:52,000
highs from 2021. Yeah.

683
00:39:52,000 --> 00:39:55,768
Audrow Nash: baby boomers are
retiring. So over half of them

684
00:39:55,768 --> 00:39:59,411
are retired now and they were at
their peak earnings. just

685
00:39:59,411 --> 00:40:03,053
before. And then once they
retired they transitioned their

686
00:40:03,053 --> 00:40:06,947
wealth into safer things, bonds
and t-bills and those sorts of

687
00:40:06,947 --> 00:40:10,841
things, and not risky funds so
then the capitol goes away. How

688
00:40:10,841 --> 00:40:14,860
do you look at that macro trend,
or what do you think is driving

689
00:40:14,860 --> 00:40:18,000
it and what do you think the
future of it will be?

690
00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:21,651
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, that
might be, if that's true, I

691
00:40:21,651 --> 00:40:25,768
might describe that as a second
or third order effect. I think

692
00:40:25,768 --> 00:40:29,485
what, the reality today is
they're like funds and people

693
00:40:29,485 --> 00:40:33,535
raise massive amounts of funds.
So there's a ton of so called

694
00:40:33,535 --> 00:40:37,651
dry powder, meaning that, funds
that were raised that have not

695
00:40:37,651 --> 00:40:40,905
yet been deployed, into
investment. So there's no

696
00:40:40,905 --> 00:40:45,154
shortage of cap, sorry, there's
no shortage of capital, today. I

697
00:40:45,154 --> 00:40:48,672
think what happened was that,
there, there's a market

698
00:40:48,672 --> 00:40:50,000
euphoria, literally,

699
00:40:50,000 --> 00:40:51,000
Audrow Nash: As a bubble,
basically.

700
00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:55,577
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, like late
2020, late, 2021. and so what

701
00:40:55,577 --> 00:41:00,007
happened is like the dollars
went through the roof and along

702
00:41:00,007 --> 00:41:02,000
with it, valuations really,

703
00:41:02,000 --> 00:41:04,000
Audrow Nash: Soared.

704
00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:07,867
Sanjay Aggarwal: and some of the
traditional fundamentals that

705
00:41:07,867 --> 00:41:11,297
people, investors were looking
for around again, market

706
00:41:11,297 --> 00:41:15,226
traction, et cetera. we're put
aside to some extent, as people,

707
00:41:15,226 --> 00:41:19,217
we're chasing, the hot deal, so
to speak. and now as the, public

708
00:41:19,217 --> 00:41:23,271
markets corrected, like then the
private markets tend to, correct

709
00:41:23,271 --> 00:41:26,826
as well. And what you see
generally in the invest, in the

710
00:41:26,826 --> 00:41:30,755
venture markets is that when you
look at very early stage deals

711
00:41:30,755 --> 00:41:34,497
like Seed and Series A, they've
actually been pretty robust.

712
00:41:34,497 --> 00:41:38,301
Actually, they haven't really
changed that much over the last

713
00:41:38,301 --> 00:41:42,168
couple of years because at those
stages, people aren't looking

714
00:41:42,168 --> 00:41:45,411
for, revenue tart, revenue
figures or whatever. Like

715
00:41:45,411 --> 00:41:49,153
they're investing in a concept,
a team, a market, et cetera.

716
00:41:49,153 --> 00:41:52,957
and, combined with the fact that
there is tons of capital out

717
00:41:52,957 --> 00:41:56,761
there to be deployed. And so
that part of the market has been

718
00:41:56,761 --> 00:42:00,378
relatively less affected and
maybe even not affected, in a

719
00:42:00,378 --> 00:42:02,000
sense. but as you get into

720
00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:05,000
Audrow Nash: You said seed and A
typically.

721
00:42:05,000 --> 00:42:08,316
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah. so those
funds, yeah, like the amount of

722
00:42:08,316 --> 00:42:11,000
money that's gone into those
stages have been flat,

723
00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:13,850
Audrow Nash: Is that in, in
robotics you're saying, or in

724
00:42:13,850 --> 00:42:15,000
startups in general or.

725
00:42:15,000 --> 00:42:17,686
Sanjay Aggarwal: it's definitely
true robotics and in general, in

726
00:42:17,686 --> 00:42:20,000
the broader market, I don't have
the exact numbers, but,

727
00:42:20,000 --> 00:42:22,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah. Just your
feeling is interesting.

728
00:42:22,000 --> 00:42:25,713
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, but as
you get into later stages, like

729
00:42:25,713 --> 00:42:29,547
B, C, D and beyond, that's where
you start to have. Challenges,

730
00:42:29,547 --> 00:42:33,320
which is that, maybe the company
was overvalued, in a previous

731
00:42:33,320 --> 00:42:36,850
round or at least overvalued
relative to current valuation

732
00:42:36,850 --> 00:42:40,380
metrics. And so now, there's a
disconnect between what the

733
00:42:40,380 --> 00:42:43,971
investor is ready to pay and
what the founder is wanting to

734
00:42:43,971 --> 00:42:47,745
raise at. And so it just creates
fiction, in terms of, raising

735
00:42:47,745 --> 00:42:51,701
rounds, maybe the metrics never,
were what they should have been.

736
00:42:51,701 --> 00:42:55,535
And they didn't really improve
the metrics over the last couple

737
00:42:55,535 --> 00:42:59,004
of years. And it just becomes
hard for companies to raise

738
00:42:59,004 --> 00:43:02,534
money at all. and so there's
been a real slowdown in those

739
00:43:02,534 --> 00:43:06,490
kind of later, mid to late stage
rounds, as I think kind of price

740
00:43:06,490 --> 00:43:10,264
discovery has been an ongoing
process. again, just meaning how

741
00:43:10,264 --> 00:43:13,855
much the investor wants to pay
versus how much the founder,

742
00:43:13,855 --> 00:43:17,385
wants to raise at. And, and then
also people were raising,

743
00:43:17,385 --> 00:43:20,793
because of those dynamics,
people were raising extension

744
00:43:20,793 --> 00:43:24,566
rounds, essentially, which is,
the existing investors put in a

745
00:43:24,566 --> 00:43:28,157
few million dollars more so I
can extend my runway before I

746
00:43:28,157 --> 00:43:31,200
have to raise again. So that
just created a delay,

747
00:43:31,200 --> 00:43:34,000
effectively, in when rounds were
being raised.

748
00:43:34,000 --> 00:43:38,276
Audrow Nash: Interesting. I've
heard one of the things related

749
00:43:38,276 --> 00:43:42,552
to what you're saying that I've
heard about and not sure again

750
00:43:42,552 --> 00:43:46,483
if it's true, but a lot of
companies in this kind of peak

751
00:43:46,483 --> 00:43:50,276
2021 Era, they raised at
ridiculous evaluations. And so

752
00:43:50,276 --> 00:43:54,483
what they would have to do to
get another round of investment

753
00:43:54,483 --> 00:43:58,345
is often do a down round. So
they would have to accept a

754
00:43:58,345 --> 00:44:02,552
smaller valuation than they got
at the previous round. And no

755
00:44:02,552 --> 00:44:06,897
one likes that bad for all the
previous investors and looks bad

756
00:44:06,897 --> 00:44:08,000
for the company.

757
00:44:08,000 --> 00:44:11,364
Sanjay Aggarwal: So that, yeah,
that's a perfect example. it

758
00:44:11,364 --> 00:44:14,000
just slows. eventually the
company needs money,

759
00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:15,000
Audrow Nash: yep.

760
00:44:15,000 --> 00:44:18,434
Sanjay Aggarwal: and in 2021,
they raised, people raised very

761
00:44:18,434 --> 00:44:21,868
large rounds. And so the runway
that they had was maybe long,

762
00:44:21,868 --> 00:44:25,189
typically it would be like 18,
24 months. Maybe they had 36

763
00:44:25,189 --> 00:44:28,510
months of runway or 48 months of
runway, especially as they

764
00:44:28,510 --> 00:44:31,944
started to cost. Just because
the round sizes were so big, so

765
00:44:31,944 --> 00:44:35,434
they were able to kick the can
down the road, so to speak. But

766
00:44:35,434 --> 00:44:38,755
eventually, either you get the
profitability or you have to

767
00:44:38,755 --> 00:44:42,076
raise, and then the reality of I
might have to raise a down

768
00:44:42,076 --> 00:44:45,397
round, it's unavoidable at that
point. I think that's where

769
00:44:45,397 --> 00:44:48,719
we're working, the market is
working its way through all of

770
00:44:48,719 --> 00:44:49,000
that.

771
00:44:49,000 --> 00:44:50,000
Audrow Nash: Interesting.

772
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:53,263
Sanjay Aggarwal: I wouldn't be
surprised, like late 2024, like

773
00:44:53,263 --> 00:44:56,211
you'll see more of that
happening or a company will just

774
00:44:56,211 --> 00:44:58,000
go out of business, which, you
see

775
00:44:58,000 --> 00:44:59,000
Audrow Nash: That

776
00:44:58,000 --> 00:45:00,769
Sanjay Aggarwal: in a while,
more and more of that, today as

777
00:45:00,769 --> 00:45:01,000
well,

778
00:45:01,000 --> 00:45:05,130
Audrow Nash: Yeah, it feels like
a lot of companies are being

779
00:45:05,130 --> 00:45:09,464
squeezed maybe because of this.
It's like too much fertilizer or

780
00:45:09,464 --> 00:45:13,661
something. It grows too fast.
It's not, then it needs more and

781
00:45:13,661 --> 00:45:17,453
then it can't get as much. So
then it dies, this kind of

782
00:45:17,453 --> 00:45:21,651
thing. What do you think? so I
actually, it sounds like you're

783
00:45:21,651 --> 00:45:25,714
saying that this is a necessary
correction in a sense in the

784
00:45:25,714 --> 00:45:29,641
markets or in the valuations
because they were in a bubble

785
00:45:29,641 --> 00:45:33,839
effectively. And so that, that
bubble has to be. Worked out in

786
00:45:33,839 --> 00:45:37,833
a sense, and then after things
will return to normal, we're

787
00:45:37,833 --> 00:45:40,000
assuming, or what, kind of thing

788
00:45:40,000 --> 00:45:43,768
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I'm not
sure what normal will be, but

789
00:45:43,768 --> 00:45:47,724
there'll be some, there'll be a
new normal, but yeah, unlike in

790
00:45:47,724 --> 00:45:51,491
public markets where there's
like a real time pricing that's

791
00:45:51,491 --> 00:45:55,385
happening, like public private
markets aren't subject to that,

792
00:45:55,385 --> 00:45:59,466
right? And they just, have a way
of taking more time to, for that

793
00:45:59,466 --> 00:46:03,171
process to play out. But it's
happening. this is why people

794
00:46:03,171 --> 00:46:06,813
are, layoffs because people are
trying to cut the burn, to

795
00:46:06,813 --> 00:46:10,078
extend the runway, to get to
better metrics. it's a,

796
00:46:10,078 --> 00:46:13,532
hopefully a healthy thing for
the market as a whole, as

797
00:46:13,532 --> 00:46:17,363
companies build more sustainable
business models. But, it can

798
00:46:17,363 --> 00:46:20,000
certainly be a painful process
at the same

799
00:46:20,000 --> 00:46:23,628
Audrow Nash: for individuals and
maybe companies. Yeah, for sure.

800
00:46:23,628 --> 00:46:26,921
what are you, the one thing
that's interesting, and I don't

801
00:46:26,921 --> 00:46:30,326
know if it's related, but I'm
curious to think, see if you do

802
00:46:30,326 --> 00:46:32,000
think it's related. it's been.

803
00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:36,961
Audrow Nash: Many, I've been
hearing that most companies are

804
00:46:36,961 --> 00:46:42,253
like, it's very hard to IPO now.
it seems like companies are not

805
00:46:42,253 --> 00:46:46,801
iPO ing, is that shaped by
similar forces because maybe

806
00:46:46,801 --> 00:46:51,680
their valuation is lower and
they don't want to do the down

807
00:46:51,680 --> 00:46:56,641
round or something with the
evaluation at the IPO or I don't

808
00:46:56,641 --> 00:47:01,850
know exactly how it works, but
any thoughts on why IPOs may not

809
00:47:01,850 --> 00:47:04,000
be happening as frequently

810
00:47:04,000 --> 00:47:07,711
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I think
there's definitely a dynamic you

811
00:47:07,711 --> 00:47:11,480
described, which is that, okay,
the valuation that you might get

812
00:47:11,480 --> 00:47:15,250
at the IPO may not be appealing,
certainly relative to your, the

813
00:47:15,250 --> 00:47:18,372
last round or what your
expectations were. So I think

814
00:47:18,372 --> 00:47:22,200
there's that part of it. I think
that the other part of it is the

815
00:47:22,200 --> 00:47:25,734
market itself, right? Is the
market ready to invest in these

816
00:47:25,734 --> 00:47:29,386
companies? And so you know, and
I think there's a huge, one of

817
00:47:29,386 --> 00:47:32,979
the things that F-Prime does
actually is spends a lot of time

818
00:47:32,979 --> 00:47:36,807
in the FinTech space. So we just
published a FinTech report also,

819
00:47:36,807 --> 00:47:40,341
and and there's like a huge
backlog of coming, like you take

820
00:47:40,341 --> 00:47:43,639
Stripe as the poster child of
the FinTech, era, there's,

821
00:47:43,639 --> 00:47:47,468
they've been, rumored to want to
go public for quite a long time,

822
00:47:47,468 --> 00:47:50,590
but they haven't yet, partly
because the market, they

823
00:47:50,590 --> 00:47:54,183
probably could go public at any
time, but, they probably have

824
00:47:54,183 --> 00:47:57,952
certain expectations about, what
valuation they, they want. And,

825
00:47:57,952 --> 00:48:01,427
so part of it is the market
itself, like how, much appetite

826
00:48:01,427 --> 00:48:04,843
is there from the market side to
support, to support these

827
00:48:04,843 --> 00:48:08,436
companies and to, give them,
attractive valuation. So I think

828
00:48:08,436 --> 00:48:11,676
it's, it seems like it's
starting a little bit. there's

829
00:48:11,676 --> 00:48:15,092
been a few recently, if I
remember, but, but yeah, I think

830
00:48:15,092 --> 00:48:18,685
that I think, as a VC, like your
exit, path ideally is either

831
00:48:18,685 --> 00:48:22,337
M&amp; A or IPO. And so if the
IPO markets are slow, like that

832
00:48:22,337 --> 00:48:25,812
affects obviously how you think
about, your, exits and your

833
00:48:25,812 --> 00:48:29,463
timelines and, and how much you
can exit for. And M&amp; A has

834
00:48:29,463 --> 00:48:33,056
also been quite slowed as a lot
of the large corporate buyers

835
00:48:33,056 --> 00:48:35,000
are, have similarly slowed
their,

836
00:48:35,000 --> 00:48:37,000
Audrow Nash: They're, subject to
the same forces too.

837
00:48:37,000 --> 00:48:40,263
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, exactly.
Their own stock might be down,

838
00:48:40,263 --> 00:48:43,105
their, they have investor
pressure to reduce cost, the

839
00:48:43,105 --> 00:48:46,474
regulatory challenges. There are
all sorts of kind of headwinds,

840
00:48:46,474 --> 00:48:49,579
I would say, in the exit market
more broadly, which is very

841
00:48:49,579 --> 00:48:51,000
market driven, I would say.

842
00:48:51,000 --> 00:48:55,266
Audrow Nash: How do you think,
and we'll go back into robotics,

843
00:48:55,266 --> 00:48:59,193
but I'm curious about all your
market, or economy point of

844
00:48:59,193 --> 00:49:03,255
view. I'm curious about your
economics takes. oh, how do you

845
00:49:03,255 --> 00:49:07,385
think the high interest rates
are affecting things? like what

846
00:49:07,385 --> 00:49:11,313
do you, to me, it makes it so
people are investing in more

847
00:49:11,313 --> 00:49:15,375
Things that are lower risk and
more likely to do better than

848
00:49:15,375 --> 00:49:19,641
like I've heard a lot of things
described as like zero interest

849
00:49:19,641 --> 00:49:23,974
phenomenons because cash was so
cheap that like just throw it at

850
00:49:23,974 --> 00:49:28,036
anything and now it's like you
need something valuable and I

851
00:49:28,036 --> 00:49:32,099
feel like it's actually doing
well for robotics but I like I

852
00:49:32,099 --> 00:49:36,229
feel like this has been like
robotics has been doing okay but

853
00:49:36,229 --> 00:49:40,224
I'm curious about your thoughts
on this and on the interest

854
00:49:40,224 --> 00:49:43,000
rates and how it's been
affecting things.

855
00:49:43,000 --> 00:49:46,528
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I think
at a simplistic level, like you

856
00:49:46,528 --> 00:49:49,886
said, the money used to be,
free, so to speak. there was no

857
00:49:49,886 --> 00:49:53,358
cost to, even if you want to
borrow money, the interest rates

858
00:49:53,358 --> 00:49:56,772
on borrowing were quite low, if
you're taking, equity money,

859
00:49:56,772 --> 00:49:57,000
etc.

860
00:49:57,000 --> 00:49:59,904
Audrow Nash: Or negative
interest rates in some silly

861
00:49:59,904 --> 00:50:01,000
places occasionally,

862
00:50:01,000 --> 00:50:04,862
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, exactly.
But, yeah, I think the, the

863
00:50:04,862 --> 00:50:08,790
simplistic way that it affects
things is people, that people

864
00:50:08,790 --> 00:50:12,717
are looking for a faster path to
profitability, right? Where

865
00:50:12,717 --> 00:50:16,579
you're not burning money, but
you're actually making money,

866
00:50:16,579 --> 00:50:20,376
right? And so I think it just
drives the behavior that, at

867
00:50:20,376 --> 00:50:24,042
least certainly investors are
expecting is, more capital

868
00:50:24,042 --> 00:50:27,904
efficient businesses. lower
burn, some, maybe being able to

869
00:50:27,904 --> 00:50:32,028
on your last round, get to, get
to profitability if you had to.

870
00:50:32,028 --> 00:50:36,152
but just, a less focus on growth
at all costs, so to speak, and

871
00:50:36,152 --> 00:50:40,145
more focus on kind of capital
efficient growth, and hopefully

872
00:50:40,145 --> 00:50:43,549
hitting some level of,
profitability of, in the, and

873
00:50:43,549 --> 00:50:46,756
depending on which stage,
obviously, but, in the,

874
00:50:46,756 --> 00:50:48,000
foreseeable future.

875
00:50:48,000 --> 00:50:52,443
Audrow Nash: Yeah. And growth at
all costs to me implies looking

876
00:50:52,443 --> 00:50:56,470
for a bigger multiple. So
they're looking for a hundred or

877
00:50:56,470 --> 00:51:00,219
a thousand times on their
investment or something like

878
00:51:00,219 --> 00:51:04,384
this. Whereas more profitable
probably implies a profitable,

879
00:51:04,384 --> 00:51:08,827
like lower risk would make it so
that maybe it's a lower Return.

880
00:51:08,827 --> 00:51:12,715
So do you think that, the
venture capital model is going

881
00:51:12,715 --> 00:51:16,811
to be changing or maybe the
average goes higher because all

882
00:51:16,811 --> 00:51:21,254
of the ones do not unicorns, but
all of the companies become not

883
00:51:21,254 --> 00:51:25,628
unicorns, but become 10x to 20x
instead of most of them failing

884
00:51:25,628 --> 00:51:29,793
and some of them being 200x or
something like that. What are

885
00:51:29,793 --> 00:51:33,889
your thoughts around maybe a
changing venture capital model

886
00:51:33,889 --> 00:51:35,000
or I don't know.

887
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:39,025
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I don't
know. Yeah, I probably don't

888
00:51:39,025 --> 00:51:42,709
have a super informed
perspective on that per se, but,

889
00:51:42,709 --> 00:51:47,007
yeah, at the end of the day, I,
I think in the, last few years,

890
00:51:47,007 --> 00:51:50,827
you saw some really significant
exits, through very high

891
00:51:50,827 --> 00:51:55,262
valuation multiples, And so that
drove some really great returns,

892
00:51:55,262 --> 00:51:59,491
I think for a lot of investors,
but that was. Abnormal, right?

893
00:51:59,491 --> 00:52:03,107
That was not the way I would say
invest, exits worked

894
00:52:03,107 --> 00:52:07,269
historically. there was a huge
run up, a bubble, whatever you

895
00:52:07,269 --> 00:52:11,498
want to call it, so that, so I
don't, I think we're going back

896
00:52:11,498 --> 00:52:15,592
to what was normal as opposed to
what was abnormal perhaps a

897
00:52:15,592 --> 00:52:19,548
couple of, years ago. So I
don't, I'm not sure that, it's,

898
00:52:19,548 --> 00:52:23,778
the companies are any more or
less risky, per se, but, rather,

899
00:52:23,778 --> 00:52:28,076
kind of valuation multiples are
back to what they used to be, a

900
00:52:28,076 --> 00:52:32,306
few years ago, or getting closer
to what they used to be a few

901
00:52:32,306 --> 00:52:36,399
years ago. And correlated to
that was companies didn't raise

902
00:52:36,399 --> 00:52:40,356
so much money, to get there,
right? doesn't mean you can't

903
00:52:40,356 --> 00:52:44,654
still get a great return, but I
think it's, you just do it in a

904
00:52:44,654 --> 00:52:48,747
more capital efficient way,
rather than raising 100 million,

905
00:52:48,747 --> 00:52:52,636
you raise 50 million, or
whatever it is, to achieve a, an

906
00:52:52,636 --> 00:52:54,000
interesting outcome.

907
00:52:54,000 --> 00:52:57,857
Audrow Nash: Yeah. Interesting.
Do you think that this will

908
00:52:57,857 --> 00:53:01,779
adjust the timeline at all? So
if you grow at any cost, this

909
00:53:01,779 --> 00:53:05,439
means to me, maybe you scale
quicker, but if you take 50

910
00:53:05,439 --> 00:53:09,427
million, maybe you have to scale
a little slower and a little

911
00:53:09,427 --> 00:53:12,956
more efficiently, and it
probably takes longer. I have

912
00:53:12,956 --> 00:53:16,813
always heard that, VC. Venture
capitalists want it's like a

913
00:53:16,813 --> 00:53:20,997
seven year timeline for funds or
something when they, invest and

914
00:53:20,997 --> 00:53:24,853
then they expect, and I'm sure
it depends on the stage, but

915
00:53:24,853 --> 00:53:28,775
they expect that there is a
merger and acquisition or an IPO

916
00:53:28,775 --> 00:53:32,697
or someone buys it or whatever
it might be. do you think the

917
00:53:32,697 --> 00:53:36,227
timeline is going to start
changing? Is it going to go

918
00:53:36,227 --> 00:53:40,280
longer or does it stay this? I
don't know. It just. Seems like

919
00:53:40,280 --> 00:53:44,202
something has to give and I
don't know. I don't, or it seems

920
00:53:44,202 --> 00:53:48,189
like there's a tradeoff in some
way, but I don't, and I'm not

921
00:53:48,189 --> 00:53:51,000
sure I fully understand. What do
you think?

922
00:53:51,000 --> 00:53:54,458
Sanjay Aggarwal: But again, I
would say that, that, that was

923
00:53:54,458 --> 00:53:57,917
always the norm, right? I think
we're going back to what the

924
00:53:57,917 --> 00:54:01,606
market used to be, as opposed to
this kind of abnormal period in

925
00:54:01,606 --> 00:54:05,353
the middle. and so I don't think
it changes the model. I think it

926
00:54:05,353 --> 00:54:08,638
just, people have to, reset
their expectations because if

927
00:54:08,638 --> 00:54:12,039
your expectation is based on
what happened in, in the last,

928
00:54:12,039 --> 00:54:15,267
like four or five years ago,
then that may not, that may

929
00:54:15,267 --> 00:54:18,206
have. That's probably not the
right expectation and

930
00:54:18,206 --> 00:54:21,780
historically was not the right
expectation either. But I think

931
00:54:21,780 --> 00:54:25,354
the exit timeline ultimately is
almost more a function of kind

932
00:54:25,354 --> 00:54:28,639
of market dynamics which kind
of, which and the market is

933
00:54:28,639 --> 00:54:32,271
cyclical in a sense, right? so
if M&amp; A's are plentiful then

934
00:54:32,271 --> 00:54:34,000
yeah, your timeline to exit is

935
00:54:34,000 --> 00:54:35,000
Audrow Nash: Maybe shorter.

936
00:54:35,000 --> 00:54:37,922
Sanjay Aggarwal: potentially
faster, But if the market, the

937
00:54:37,922 --> 00:54:41,042
M&amp; A market dries up in the
way that it has the last couple

938
00:54:41,042 --> 00:54:44,063
of years then, then you're going
to have to wait longer, so I

939
00:54:44,063 --> 00:54:47,084
don't, so it's, it is correlated
to what you're describing in

940
00:54:47,084 --> 00:54:49,560
terms of how fast you're
growing, but I think it's

941
00:54:49,560 --> 00:54:52,581
probably even more driven by the
exit, the health of the exit

942
00:54:52,581 --> 00:54:55,602
market, whether it's M&amp; A or
IPO, and if the IPO market's

943
00:54:55,602 --> 00:54:58,425
closed, it's closed, like
there's nothing much you can do

944
00:54:58,425 --> 00:55:01,000
about it, no matter how fast or
slow you're growing.

945
00:55:01,000 --> 00:55:02,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah, for sure.

946
00:55:02,000 --> 00:55:06,345
Audrow Nash: What do you, so one
thing that I've heard, which I

947
00:55:06,345 --> 00:55:10,690
thought was very interesting is
that, so you guys, F-Prime, are

948
00:55:10,690 --> 00:55:14,759
investing in seed and series a
typically, and it strikes me

949
00:55:14,759 --> 00:55:18,483
that there is quite a lot of
investment firms that are

950
00:55:18,483 --> 00:55:22,897
investing in robotics companies
at series A and seed levels. And

951
00:55:22,897 --> 00:55:27,310
it seems like when you go BC, it
gets a bit harder and maybe you

952
00:55:27,310 --> 00:55:31,586
go to I don't know, Sequoia or
some of these really large ones

953
00:55:31,586 --> 00:55:35,793
for these later rounds. How do
you, think about this and what

954
00:55:35,793 --> 00:55:40,069
do you think around the idea of
Series B and beyond being very

955
00:55:40,069 --> 00:55:42,000
hard for robotics companies?

956
00:55:42,000 --> 00:55:45,556
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I, yeah,
I would say that it's definitely

957
00:55:45,556 --> 00:55:48,889
the hardest stage to invest, to
raise money in as a robotics

958
00:55:48,889 --> 00:55:51,611
company. you see that
historically and you see it

959
00:55:51,611 --> 00:55:53,000
particularly in the last,

960
00:55:53,000 --> 00:55:55,000
Audrow Nash: You're saying B and
C?

961
00:55:55,000 --> 00:55:58,387
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah,
absolutely. Because, and I think

962
00:55:58,387 --> 00:56:02,266
there's, again, as I said, and
the seed in Series A, to a large

963
00:56:02,266 --> 00:56:05,960
extent, like you're excited
about the company, the use case,

964
00:56:05,960 --> 00:56:09,716
the team, you're betting on the
future in a sense, right? and

965
00:56:09,716 --> 00:56:13,349
more and more investors getting
involved in those stages as

966
00:56:13,349 --> 00:56:16,736
well, because, as you think
about the, just the general

967
00:56:16,736 --> 00:56:20,184
tailwinds, around the industry,
whether it's AI or labor

968
00:56:20,184 --> 00:56:23,879
shortages or these kinds of
things, like robotics seems like

969
00:56:23,879 --> 00:56:27,450
a great place to address and
kind of capitalize on some of

970
00:56:27,450 --> 00:56:31,329
those tailwinds. and so you see
more and more of. more and more

971
00:56:31,329 --> 00:56:35,024
companies making early stage
investments where again, you're

972
00:56:35,024 --> 00:56:38,533
betting on the future, the
future, what's possible in the

973
00:56:38,533 --> 00:56:42,351
future, than anything. and then
as you get to later stages, as

974
00:56:42,351 --> 00:56:45,922
you get to a D or E round, by
that time you have, again, a

975
00:56:45,922 --> 00:56:49,802
different set of investors that
are just investing based on the

976
00:56:49,802 --> 00:56:53,373
performance of the business,
like how, what's the revenue,

977
00:56:53,373 --> 00:56:57,006
what's the metrics, all those
kinds of things. And so it's,

978
00:56:57,006 --> 00:57:00,700
analyzed to some extent, just
like any other, a category of,

979
00:57:00,700 --> 00:57:04,210
of, company would, invest in.
You even see private equity

980
00:57:04,210 --> 00:57:08,151
firms, starting to get involved,
in, at those stages. And again,

981
00:57:08,151 --> 00:57:11,538
they're underwritten, the
investment is analyzed in the

982
00:57:11,538 --> 00:57:15,232
same way that you might analyze
any other investment. In the

983
00:57:15,232 --> 00:57:18,557
middle is the hard part, where
you started to get some

984
00:57:18,557 --> 00:57:22,190
traction, you have some metrics,
but not that many metrics,

985
00:57:22,190 --> 00:57:25,823
oftentimes you have a big, if
you're doing well, you have a

986
00:57:25,823 --> 00:57:29,641
big, Backlog of contracts, but
they haven't been deployed yet,

987
00:57:29,641 --> 00:57:33,397
or, you have some new product
that's coming out, that's going

988
00:57:33,397 --> 00:57:37,091
to, you started with a very
niche product, with a very small

989
00:57:37,091 --> 00:57:40,724
TAM, you have a new product
that's coming out, that's going

990
00:57:40,724 --> 00:57:44,172
to expand the TAM, so you
haven't quite, you starting to

991
00:57:44,172 --> 00:57:47,805
hit some kind of interesting
commercial milestones, but you

992
00:57:47,805 --> 00:57:51,438
haven't figured out the whole
story yet. and I think that's

993
00:57:51,438 --> 00:57:55,071
where the market is really
getting squeezed today, which is

994
00:57:55,071 --> 00:57:58,827
that. many investors, will come
back and say, okay, great, we

995
00:57:58,827 --> 00:58:02,029
love the story, but come back
when you've proven it,

996
00:58:02,029 --> 00:58:05,231
effectively, right? And so I
think that the need for

997
00:58:05,231 --> 00:58:08,987
commercial proof points, not
just, hey, you're, talented team

998
00:58:08,987 --> 00:58:12,743
and you have a great technology
and you have a great product,

999
00:58:12,743 --> 00:58:16,561
but I actually need to see real
commercial traction, adoption,

1000
00:58:16,561 --> 00:58:20,255
et cetera. I think those are
that's the, Those kind of B and

1001
00:58:20,255 --> 00:58:23,888
to some extent C rounds is where
you're just on the cusp of

1002
00:58:23,888 --> 00:58:27,767
getting those typically. and if
you don't have them, then okay,

1003
00:58:27,767 --> 00:58:31,523
you may not be able to raise at
all. And you've actually seen

1004
00:58:31,523 --> 00:58:35,279
some shutdowns of companies, in
those situations. and, but if

1005
00:58:35,279 --> 00:58:39,036
you, and if, but if you have
them, then again, like you're in

1006
00:58:39,036 --> 00:58:42,545
this, sort of situation where,
Investor likes what you're

1007
00:58:42,545 --> 00:58:45,932
doing, but they want to see
more, they want to see more

1008
00:58:45,932 --> 00:58:49,257
traction. And then what
inevitably has happened in the

1009
00:58:49,257 --> 00:58:53,013
market is then companies will
raise their Series A extension,

1010
00:58:53,013 --> 00:58:56,646
so they'll go back to the,
Series A investors and say, hey,

1011
00:58:56,646 --> 00:59:00,402
things are looking good, but we
need 12 more months of runway

1012
00:59:00,402 --> 00:59:04,097
to, to get to more commercial
proof points, will you support

1013
00:59:04,097 --> 00:59:07,791
us to get there? and so I think
you're, seeing a lot of that

1014
00:59:07,791 --> 00:59:11,547
nowadays. And again, like the,
challenge is really how do you

1015
00:59:11,547 --> 00:59:15,365
get enough kind of commercial
speed and, those, the validation

1016
00:59:15,365 --> 00:59:19,244
that people can start to see the
path of how do you get from, a

1017
00:59:19,244 --> 00:59:22,692
few deployments to tens to
hundreds of deployments, over

1018
00:59:22,692 --> 00:59:23,000
time.

1019
00:59:23,000 --> 00:59:27,200
Audrow Nash: Yeah. Very
interesting. Yeah, that B C does

1020
00:59:27,200 --> 00:59:29,000
seem like a big squeeze.

1021
00:59:29,000 --> 00:59:32,449
Sanjay Aggarwal: And we see,
companies all the time that,

1022
00:59:32,449 --> 00:59:36,201
that are, we did see companies
that, they're trying to raise a

1023
00:59:36,201 --> 00:59:39,892
B and they still have just pilot
revenue, for example, right?

1024
00:59:39,892 --> 00:59:43,341
that's a very challenging place
to be. And, some of those

1025
00:59:43,341 --> 00:59:46,729
companies have ended up just
shutting down, because they

1026
00:59:46,729 --> 00:59:50,360
couldn't, there wasn't enough
investor support, to give them

1027
00:59:50,360 --> 00:59:54,051
the runway to actually get to
production deployments. whereas

1028
00:59:54,051 --> 00:59:57,500
three or four years ago, you
could probably raise on that

1029
00:59:57,500 --> 01:00:01,131
story. Hey, we have a great
technology. We're in pilots with

1030
01:00:01,131 --> 01:00:04,882
these great, great customers.
will you invest? now I think the

1031
01:00:04,882 --> 01:00:07,000
bar on, performance is much
higher.

1032
01:00:07,000 --> 01:00:11,459
Audrow Nash: Yeah, very
interesting. So do you think,

1033
01:00:11,459 --> 01:00:16,507
how do you imagine this going
over time? One, one way that I

1034
01:00:16,507 --> 01:00:21,891
could see it is so like you guys
at F-Prime companies like Alley

1035
01:00:21,891 --> 01:00:27,023
Corp, any, other like series A
and seed investors do well off

1036
01:00:27,023 --> 01:00:31,734
of theirs, their robotics
companies, maybe in five years

1037
01:00:31,734 --> 01:00:36,782
time. And then You guys grow
into a B and C funding and help

1038
01:00:36,782 --> 01:00:41,746
make that squeeze a little bit
easier or is it necessary to

1039
01:00:41,746 --> 01:00:46,709
have that squeeze or like I
guess what's the evolution that

1040
01:00:46,709 --> 01:00:51,000
you imagine seeing of funding in
the B and C space?

1041
01:00:51,000 --> 01:00:54,467
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, I think
it'll probably be a little bit

1042
01:00:54,467 --> 01:00:57,992
less of what you described, and
I, said that only because just

1043
01:00:57,992 --> 01:01:01,516
given the size of our fund, we
focus on a specific year. There

1044
01:01:01,516 --> 01:01:04,926
are other like very large, they
raised a billion dollars for

1045
01:01:04,926 --> 01:01:07,825
their fund and they are
explicitly like multi stage

1046
01:01:07,825 --> 01:01:11,122
funds, right? So you have a
number of those, that will do.

1047
01:01:11,122 --> 01:01:14,533
Seed, and Series A and Series B.
And so a little bit of that

1048
01:01:14,533 --> 01:01:17,773
dynamic may exist in what, with
those types of funds, but

1049
01:01:17,773 --> 01:01:21,411
they're not, there are, there's
some, but they're, and there's a

1050
01:01:21,411 --> 01:01:24,537
lot of capital in those funds.
But, but that's not, the

1051
01:01:24,537 --> 01:01:27,720
majority of the capital out
there. yeah, like with those

1052
01:01:27,720 --> 01:01:31,244
funds, except they're investing
in robotics, maybe they start,

1053
01:01:31,244 --> 01:01:34,712
they dip their toe in the seed
and Series A, if it goes well,

1054
01:01:34,712 --> 01:01:37,895
they start, getting more
involved in later stages. But I

1055
01:01:37,895 --> 01:01:41,305
think the real, I think the real
driver of excitement at the

1056
01:01:41,305 --> 01:01:45,000
B&amp;C is when you start to see
more exits, essentially one more

1057
01:01:45,000 --> 01:01:47,000
Audrow Nash: Oh, okay.

1058
01:01:47,000 --> 01:01:50,150
Sanjay Aggarwal: all flows
downhill, right? if you, if

1059
01:01:50,150 --> 01:01:53,883
people see, Oh, wow, that was a
great outcome. people made a ton

1060
01:01:53,883 --> 01:01:57,208
of money on that company, and
there's not one or two, but

1061
01:01:57,208 --> 01:02:00,767
there's 10 and 20 examples, then
people can start to say, Oh,

1062
01:02:00,767 --> 01:02:04,267
okay, this is what Success looks
like, and, if we rewind the

1063
01:02:04,267 --> 01:02:07,825
clock, this is what that company
that just sold for a billion

1064
01:02:07,825 --> 01:02:11,208
dollars looked like at the
series B, this new company that

1065
01:02:11,208 --> 01:02:14,183
we're looking at, seems to
exhibit some of the same

1066
01:02:14,183 --> 01:02:17,858
characteristics, right? And so I
think it will, it'll come more

1067
01:02:17,858 --> 01:02:21,417
from that. angle, which is you
have successful companies that

1068
01:02:21,417 --> 01:02:25,092
have exits. they make a bunch of
money for the founders and the

1069
01:02:25,092 --> 01:02:28,825
investors, and then that kind of
paves the way for more and more

1070
01:02:28,825 --> 01:02:32,150
such companies because people
see what success looks like

1071
01:02:32,150 --> 01:02:35,358
essentially, and what it looks
like at each stage of an

1072
01:02:35,358 --> 01:02:36,000
investment.

1073
01:02:36,000 --> 01:02:39,953
Audrow Nash: Interesting. Yeah,
I interviewed Bluewhite, one

1074
01:02:39,953 --> 01:02:43,907
thing that they were saying,
which I found very interesting,

1075
01:02:43,907 --> 01:02:48,058
is that they feel like they have
a personal responsibility as a

1076
01:02:48,058 --> 01:02:52,209
robotics company. I believe they
just got their It was either B

1077
01:02:52,209 --> 01:02:53,000
or C funding

1078
01:02:53,000 --> 01:02:54,000
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah,

1079
01:02:53,000 --> 01:02:57,186
Audrow Nash: and they have a
personal responsibility to keep

1080
01:02:57,186 --> 01:03:01,233
going and do well because it
ushers in more great robotics

1081
01:03:01,233 --> 01:03:05,000
companies. It makes it easier
for them to get funding.

1082
01:03:05,000 --> 01:03:08,567
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, one of
the, one of my beliefs as to why

1083
01:03:08,567 --> 01:03:12,307
logistics is such a hot area, in
the world of robotics, logistics

1084
01:03:12,307 --> 01:03:15,529
is amongst the hottest areas, is
because there have been

1085
01:03:15,529 --> 01:03:18,923
successful exits, Kiva was
bought for a few hundred million

1086
01:03:18,923 --> 01:03:22,548
dollars, Six River Systems was
bought for a few hundred million

1087
01:03:22,548 --> 01:03:26,058
dollars, like there have been
exits, and People can see that,

1088
01:03:26,058 --> 01:03:29,337
yeah, there is a path to an
exit, in those businesses and

1089
01:03:29,337 --> 01:03:33,019
successful exits. If you look at
medical robotics, there've been

1090
01:03:33,019 --> 01:03:36,184
a, a number of very large
outcomes, of medical robotics

1091
01:03:36,184 --> 01:03:39,578
companies. So there's, again,
people can see that there's a

1092
01:03:39,578 --> 01:03:42,512
path, if you look at
agriculture, for example, it's

1093
01:03:42,512 --> 01:03:45,964
still early days. there've been
a couple of acquisitions by,

1094
01:03:45,964 --> 01:03:49,244
John Deere made a couple of
acquisitions. but there were,

1095
01:03:49,244 --> 01:03:52,408
mid sized 250, 300 million
dollar type of acquisitions,

1096
01:03:52,408 --> 01:03:55,918
which are, which were great, in
many ways, but, they weren't,

1097
01:03:55,918 --> 01:03:59,197
they weren't like the home run
type of investment for the

1098
01:03:59,197 --> 01:04:02,707
investors necessarily. So they
were good enough to get people

1099
01:04:02,707 --> 01:04:06,159
interested, but probably not
good enough to people to really

1100
01:04:06,159 --> 01:04:08,000
pile into the category just yet,

1101
01:04:08,000 --> 01:04:09,000
Audrow Nash: Oh,

1102
01:04:09,000 --> 01:04:13,633
Sanjay Aggarwal: Again, like the
path to success has not been

1103
01:04:13,633 --> 01:04:15,000
proven completely.

1104
01:04:15,000 --> 01:04:18,968
Audrow Nash: and there hasn't
been like huge wins, even though

1105
01:04:18,968 --> 01:04:22,808
there's been some pretty good
wins. that's been a thing that

1106
01:04:22,808 --> 01:04:26,456
I've been hearing too, where
you're seeing robotics exits

1107
01:04:26,456 --> 01:04:29,784
that are like hundreds of
millions of dollars, not a

1108
01:04:29,784 --> 01:04:31,000
billion or more for

1109
01:04:31,000 --> 01:04:35,172
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah. and even
that, and we were actually just

1110
01:04:35,172 --> 01:04:39,278
running the numbers. there have
been 25 robotics exits greater

1111
01:04:39,278 --> 01:04:41,000
than. 250 million dollars,

1112
01:04:41,000 --> 01:04:42,000
Audrow Nash: It's awesome.

1113
01:04:42,000 --> 01:04:45,886
Sanjay Aggarwal: 25 may seem
like a lot, but it's actually a

1114
01:04:45,886 --> 01:04:49,643
drop in the bucket in the world
of venture capital. If you

1115
01:04:49,643 --> 01:04:53,659
looked at enterprise software,
the 25 might be a thousand, for

1116
01:04:53,659 --> 01:04:57,675
example, right? And I don't know
what the number is, it's very

1117
01:04:57,675 --> 01:05:01,172
small in relation to what, the
broader, venture backed

1118
01:05:01,172 --> 01:05:05,253
community, has produced and so
all it means is it's still early

1119
01:05:05,253 --> 01:05:09,074
days. there are a bunch of
companies out there that haven't

1120
01:05:09,074 --> 01:05:13,025
exited yet. but I think if you
start to see successful exits,

1121
01:05:13,025 --> 01:05:16,523
in the category more generally
as well as in specific,

1122
01:05:16,523 --> 01:05:20,215
verticals, I think that will
spur more investment. And it

1123
01:05:20,215 --> 01:05:23,000
just becomes a virtuous cycle,
essentially.

1124
01:05:23,000 --> 01:05:27,223
Audrow Nash: Yeah. It's very
interesting. Do you have any,

1125
01:05:27,223 --> 01:05:31,665
idea? I, would love to see, The,
distribution of the exits. I

1126
01:05:31,665 --> 01:05:36,034
wonder if that's in the report,
but if I, you could see like

1127
01:05:36,034 --> 01:05:38,000
this many at this much and,

1128
01:05:38,000 --> 01:05:40,085
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, we
actually, when the report comes

1129
01:05:40,085 --> 01:05:41,000
out, you'll see it there.

1130
01:05:41,000 --> 01:05:42,000
Audrow Nash: I'd love to see

1131
01:05:42,000 --> 01:05:45,132
Sanjay Aggarwal: we had some
version of it in last year's

1132
01:05:45,132 --> 01:05:47,989
report, but yeah, we did
something a little bit more

1133
01:05:47,989 --> 01:05:51,451
detailed, this time around. and
yeah, it's, it's, good, but not

1134
01:05:51,451 --> 01:05:52,000
yet great.

1135
01:05:52,000 --> 01:05:54,000
Audrow Nash: It's still early.
Yeah.

1136
01:05:54,000 --> 01:05:57,077
Sanjay Aggarwal: still early
days, because most of these

1137
01:05:57,077 --> 01:06:00,209
companies, they were funded in
the last three, four, five

1138
01:06:00,209 --> 01:06:03,615
years, right? And back to your
point of it may take you seven,

1139
01:06:03,615 --> 01:06:06,582
ten years to get to an exit,
right? Like we aren't, we

1140
01:06:06,582 --> 01:06:09,659
haven't gone through a full
cycle, for the most part, to

1141
01:06:09,659 --> 01:06:13,011
really know what the, outcome of
those early, the investments

1142
01:06:13,011 --> 01:06:16,582
that were made three, four years
ago, we haven't gotten to a full

1143
01:06:16,582 --> 01:06:19,000
cycle to see how do those turn
out just yet.

1144
01:06:19,000 --> 01:06:23,740
Audrow Nash: what do you think?
So we're in early days. what do

1145
01:06:23,740 --> 01:06:28,556
you imagine the timeline is? For
this. So like the one cycle, is

1146
01:06:28,556 --> 01:06:32,845
it a few cycles from your
perspective? And I know this is

1147
01:06:32,845 --> 01:06:37,434
a wild speculation, but I'd love
to still hear your thoughts.

1148
01:06:37,434 --> 01:06:41,874
What do you imagine is the
timeline for robotics companies?

1149
01:06:41,874 --> 01:06:46,539
Like, how does it look over the
next five years, 10 years, 15,

1150
01:06:46,539 --> 01:06:50,000
20, or whatever you think would
be significant

1151
01:06:50,000 --> 01:06:53,681
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, so we're
obviously bullish and we spend a

1152
01:06:53,681 --> 01:06:56,845
lot of time and I personally
spend a lot of time in the

1153
01:06:56,845 --> 01:07:00,411
category. So where I'm bullish,
I'm hopeful that it will, turn

1154
01:07:00,411 --> 01:07:03,689
out better than not. And as I
said, there are a number of

1155
01:07:03,689 --> 01:07:07,141
companies that are starting to
reach some interesting scale,

1156
01:07:07,141 --> 01:07:10,362
across many different sectors.
If in logistics, you have

1157
01:07:10,362 --> 01:07:13,698
companies like, there's a
company called GreyOrange, which

1158
01:07:13,698 --> 01:07:16,919
is, doing well, there's a
company called Locus Robotics,

1159
01:07:16,919 --> 01:07:20,427
which is doing well, and there's
a others that have actually,

1160
01:07:20,427 --> 01:07:23,303
have really significant
commercial traction in the

1161
01:07:23,303 --> 01:07:26,870
hundreds of millions of dollars
kind of revenue, right? So you

1162
01:07:26,870 --> 01:07:30,263
can certainly envision those
companies out there. having an

1163
01:07:30,263 --> 01:07:33,887
IPO, let's say, if not an M&amp;
A outcome, that is, not in the

1164
01:07:33,887 --> 01:07:37,108
hundreds of millions, but is
actually in the billions of

1165
01:07:37,108 --> 01:07:40,674
dollars, type of, type of exit.
and that, that could be within

1166
01:07:40,674 --> 01:07:43,665
the next, couple of years,
frankly, right? And maybe

1167
01:07:43,665 --> 01:07:47,231
sooner, depending on the state
of the markets. in defense, you

1168
01:07:47,231 --> 01:07:50,452
have companies like Anduril,
right? like they've raised,

1169
01:07:50,452 --> 01:07:54,133
they've raised insane amounts of
money. they were, I think, last

1170
01:07:54,133 --> 01:07:57,815
valued at eight billion dollars.
if they have a successful exit,

1171
01:07:57,815 --> 01:08:01,381
I think that will really spur a
lot of excitement. And there's

1172
01:08:01,381 --> 01:08:04,774
already a lot of money going
into defense related, robotics

1173
01:08:04,774 --> 01:08:08,398
companies. I think it, again, it
creates that virtuous cycle in

1174
01:08:08,398 --> 01:08:11,907
some of these use cases. Others,
like agriculture, as I said,

1175
01:08:11,907 --> 01:08:15,300
like I think the the companies
tend to be three, four, five

1176
01:08:15,300 --> 01:08:18,867
years old, So I think we have
another, five years to go before

1177
01:08:18,867 --> 01:08:22,260
you start to see, what the
result of those investments are,

1178
01:08:22,260 --> 01:08:25,826
those early stage investments.
So I think different stages are

1179
01:08:25,826 --> 01:08:29,047
at different places. Like AV
came and went, if you will,

1180
01:08:29,047 --> 01:08:32,614
right? I think some of the early
excitement in AV was because,

1181
01:08:32,614 --> 01:08:36,180
okay, Cruise got acquired and
Neutonomy got acquired and there

1182
01:08:36,180 --> 01:08:39,803
were really big outcomes and I
think that, caused, in some ways

1183
01:08:39,803 --> 01:08:43,485
caused investors to pile in. and
unfortunately it hasn't, it may

1184
01:08:43,485 --> 01:08:46,993
not pan out ultimately, but, but
as you go into other sectors

1185
01:08:46,993 --> 01:08:50,617
like logistics, there've already
been some initial exits. There

1186
01:08:50,617 --> 01:08:54,011
are other companies that are
poised to exit soon, literally

1187
01:08:54,011 --> 01:08:57,577
in the matter of, a year or two.
and then there's others, like

1188
01:08:57,577 --> 01:09:01,143
agriculture, where the companies
are still really young and it

1189
01:09:01,143 --> 01:09:04,536
may take another, five, six
years to get there. But I think

1190
01:09:04,536 --> 01:09:07,930
if If these things play out the
way I hope, like I think it

1191
01:09:07,930 --> 01:09:11,209
will, again, create this
virtuous cycle around people see

1192
01:09:11,209 --> 01:09:14,832
that, okay, yeah, you can have
big exits, you can make a ton of

1193
01:09:14,832 --> 01:09:18,283
money, as an investor in these
categories, as a founder, you

1194
01:09:18,283 --> 01:09:21,620
can see that, hey, there's a
great opportunity here, it'll

1195
01:09:21,620 --> 01:09:23,000
just spur more activity.

1196
01:09:23,000 --> 01:09:26,591
Audrow Nash: So a thing that I
think is very interesting is

1197
01:09:26,591 --> 01:09:30,183
that when talking to a lot of
robotics companies, one thing

1198
01:09:30,183 --> 01:09:33,652
that is highlighted very often
is the labor shortages and

1199
01:09:33,652 --> 01:09:37,000
that's a big motivation for
them. And if you look in, I

1200
01:09:37,000 --> 01:09:40,104
don't know, manufacturing
logistics, like there are

1201
01:09:40,104 --> 01:09:43,513
massive, labor shortages, and
they're only increasing, I

1202
01:09:43,513 --> 01:09:44,000
believe.

1203
01:09:44,000 --> 01:09:45,000
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah.

1204
01:09:45,000 --> 01:09:49,613
Audrow Nash: do you, how do you
think that will affect

1205
01:09:49,613 --> 01:09:54,055
investment and timeline for
these different robotics

1206
01:09:54,055 --> 01:09:59,523
companies? Or do you think it's
a big factor too? Or how, how do

1207
01:09:59,523 --> 01:10:02,000
you think about it I suppose?

1208
01:10:02,000 --> 01:10:05,441
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah,
realistically, like that's a

1209
01:10:05,441 --> 01:10:09,692
pretty standard part of, your,
most robotics companies pitch as

1210
01:10:09,692 --> 01:10:13,943
to why, why now, in a sense. but
I think what we've realized is

1211
01:10:13,943 --> 01:10:17,654
that's not alone to drive
adoption, right? in the sense

1212
01:10:17,654 --> 01:10:21,635
that like the solution has to
really be foolproof in a way,

1213
01:10:21,635 --> 01:10:25,886
right? Because it can't be, it
works. 75 percent of the time it

1214
01:10:25,886 --> 01:10:30,069
doesn't work 25 percent because
then they just won't use it at

1215
01:10:30,069 --> 01:10:33,983
all, a sense. And so I think
it's a, it's a necessary, but

1216
01:10:33,983 --> 01:10:37,559
not sufficient, driver of
adoption ultimately. Like I

1217
01:10:37,559 --> 01:10:41,000
think that because of that, it
causes customers to,

1218
01:10:41,000 --> 01:10:42,000
Audrow Nash: Look for things.

1219
01:10:42,000 --> 01:10:45,215
Sanjay Aggarwal: look for
solutions, try solutions. If the

1220
01:10:45,215 --> 01:10:48,652
solution doesn't, yeah, if the
solution doesn't fit seamlessly

1221
01:10:48,652 --> 01:10:51,646
into your workflow, if it
doesn't work, almost all the

1222
01:10:51,646 --> 01:10:54,861
time so that there's very few
exceptions, if there's not a

1223
01:10:54,861 --> 01:10:57,800
good, if the company is not
supporting, the, solution

1224
01:10:57,800 --> 01:11:01,126
properly, I think all those
things necessarily have to be in

1225
01:11:01,126 --> 01:11:04,397
place to drive adoption. Because
again, it's a new piece of

1226
01:11:04,397 --> 01:11:07,168
equipment that's sitting there,
oftentimes like in

1227
01:11:07,168 --> 01:11:10,439
manufacturing, it's It's all or
none. Like you have a robot

1228
01:11:10,439 --> 01:11:13,876
that's doing the whole system,
right? There is no alternative,

1229
01:11:13,876 --> 01:11:17,036
in many of the newer generations
of robotics, it's a mix,

1230
01:11:17,036 --> 01:11:20,085
there's, they're sprinkled in
with humans. And so if it

1231
01:11:20,085 --> 01:11:23,301
doesn't work, the person like
take Burrow, for example, if

1232
01:11:23,301 --> 01:11:26,461
the, if Burrow's system doesn't
work, there's also people

1233
01:11:26,461 --> 01:11:29,953
driving around and will, walking
around in wheelbarrows, right?

1234
01:11:29,953 --> 01:11:33,279
They'll just like. Say, okay,
let me, put this aside and let

1235
01:11:33,279 --> 01:11:36,439
me go back to the old way of
doing things. And it doesn't

1236
01:11:36,439 --> 01:11:39,821
matter what the labor shortages
are. Like they got to get the

1237
01:11:39,821 --> 01:11:43,313
job done. so I think the, again,
the labor shortage are a good,

1238
01:11:43,313 --> 01:11:46,917
impetus, like you really got to,
and this is where again, go back

1239
01:11:46,917 --> 01:11:49,855
to just entrepreneurs
understanding use cases around,

1240
01:11:49,855 --> 01:11:53,126
how do you actually build a
system that works and that fits

1241
01:11:53,126 --> 01:11:56,507
seamlessly into a workflow so
that it works all the time, not

1242
01:11:56,507 --> 01:12:00,000
some of the time, because some
of the time is as good as never.

1243
01:12:00,000 --> 01:12:05,404
Audrow Nash: Yeah. When, when
does some of the time become

1244
01:12:05,404 --> 01:12:11,273
enough? is it 99%? Is it 95%? Is
it 99. 99%? Or, and I guess it

1245
01:12:11,273 --> 01:12:15,000
probably depends on the
application, but

1246
01:12:15,000 --> 01:12:17,791
Sanjay Aggarwal: I think it
depends on your approach in some

1247
01:12:17,791 --> 01:12:20,535
way. So I'll, give you two,
examples. so we're investors in

1248
01:12:20,535 --> 01:12:23,000
a company called Taleo, like
their explicit strategy.

1249
01:12:23,000 --> 01:12:25,000
Audrow Nash: That's the mining
one. that correct?

1250
01:12:25,000 --> 01:12:28,391
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yes, yeah,
exactly. They basically have a.

1251
01:12:28,391 --> 01:12:31,552
they, work on any piece of large
construction or mining

1252
01:12:31,552 --> 01:12:34,655
equipment. I think of an
excavator, massive multi ton,

1253
01:12:34,655 --> 01:12:37,874
hundred thousand, multi hundred
thousand dollar piece of

1254
01:12:37,874 --> 01:12:41,437
equipment. And their strategy
is, is what they call supervised

1255
01:12:41,437 --> 01:12:44,655
autonomy. So it's basically a
human in the loop approach

1256
01:12:44,655 --> 01:12:45,000
where,

1257
01:12:45,000 --> 01:12:46,000
Audrow Nash: It's a smart
approach. Yeah.

1258
01:12:46,000 --> 01:12:49,198
Sanjay Aggarwal: So they
retrofit the machine with a kit

1259
01:12:49,198 --> 01:12:52,739
that enables you to operate the
machine remotely, essentially.

1260
01:12:52,739 --> 01:12:56,109
and so what happens there is
that, you can automate part of

1261
01:12:56,109 --> 01:12:59,764
the task. So the task that they
typically do is where, what they

1262
01:12:59,764 --> 01:13:03,019
call is, let's say you're
digging some dirt and then they

1263
01:13:03,019 --> 01:13:06,274
have a process they call
tramming, which is like you move

1264
01:13:06,274 --> 01:13:09,644
the dirt from point A to point B
and then you dump the dirt

1265
01:13:09,644 --> 01:13:13,185
somewhere else. And this is done
repeatedly over time. Now for

1266
01:13:13,185 --> 01:13:16,326
them, you can either do it
completely remotely, and the

1267
01:13:16,326 --> 01:13:19,638
human is there doing it, or,
over time, you can, or if you

1268
01:13:19,638 --> 01:13:22,894
choose, you can automate the
tramming part of it. Now, in

1269
01:13:22,894 --> 01:13:26,206
that case, if the automation
doesn't work for some reason,

1270
01:13:26,206 --> 01:13:29,861
maybe there's some obstacle, who
knows what the reason might be,

1271
01:13:29,861 --> 01:13:32,945
the human is there anyway,
right? Again, 50 percent is

1272
01:13:32,945 --> 01:13:36,657
probably not good enough, but it
doesn't have to be 99 percent on

1273
01:13:36,657 --> 01:13:39,570
the autonomy part, because
there's a human, there's

1274
01:13:39,570 --> 01:13:42,997
necessarily a human in the loop
in the process. So it's more

1275
01:13:42,997 --> 01:13:46,309
kind of robust to potential
failures, and if you take, but

1276
01:13:46,309 --> 01:13:49,679
on the flip side, if you take
Burrow, for example, if their

1277
01:13:49,679 --> 01:13:53,162
system, Isn't able to autonomous
like it, if it's not able to

1278
01:13:53,162 --> 01:13:56,303
autonomously traverse the path
that they're supposed to

1279
01:13:56,303 --> 01:13:59,673
traverse, then it, it's as good
as dead, right? there's, no

1280
01:13:59,673 --> 01:14:03,157
utility to the solution at that
point in time. That has to be

1281
01:14:03,157 --> 01:14:06,526
much, much more, robust. but
even for them, what they do is

1282
01:14:06,526 --> 01:14:09,896
okay, like it's a low speed
applications, so worst comes to

1283
01:14:09,896 --> 01:14:12,980
worst, like they may stop
because they found something

1284
01:14:12,980 --> 01:14:16,521
that they didn't expect, and the
operator can just start it up

1285
01:14:16,521 --> 01:14:19,605
again, and it'll just go on its
way. But if the system

1286
01:14:19,605 --> 01:14:22,917
completely fails, okay, the
motor went out, and it's just,

1287
01:14:22,917 --> 01:14:26,401
it's, inoperable, like that's a
problem, right? that, that is

1288
01:14:26,401 --> 01:14:28,000
not, that is not acceptable.

1289
01:14:28,000 --> 01:14:32,055
Audrow Nash: Yeah. Now I, that
makes a lot of sense, but it

1290
01:14:32,055 --> 01:14:36,384
makes me question, Why not just
always have a human in the loop

1291
01:14:36,384 --> 01:14:40,645
for this kind of thing? Like in
the Burrow case, if it becomes

1292
01:14:40,645 --> 01:14:44,836
dead because it has something
unexpected, why not just always

1293
01:14:44,836 --> 01:14:48,616
have a, what would be the
disadvantage of, I guess it's

1294
01:14:48,616 --> 01:14:52,808
more expensive, but why not just
have most robotics companies

1295
01:14:52,808 --> 01:14:56,588
bake in a human that can
intervene if it does something

1296
01:14:56,588 --> 01:14:57,000
funny?

1297
01:14:57,000 --> 01:15:00,692
Sanjay Aggarwal: I think you're
seeing that more and more, and

1298
01:15:00,692 --> 01:15:03,968
again, particularly in the
industrial setting, right? I

1299
01:15:03,968 --> 01:15:07,660
think this is where, passenger
vehicle use cases, it was hard,

1300
01:15:07,660 --> 01:15:11,292
right? And I think people did
create, certain ways to, have a

1301
01:15:11,292 --> 01:15:14,568
human intervene if there's an
obstacle that they didn't

1302
01:15:14,568 --> 01:15:18,200
understand or whatever. But I
think the stakes are very high,

1303
01:15:18,200 --> 01:15:21,833
in those kinds of cases. And the
fault tolerance, even if you

1304
01:15:21,833 --> 01:15:25,585
have a, a human remote operator
is just so low, that it becomes

1305
01:15:25,585 --> 01:15:29,158
hard to execute. I think in an
industrial setting, it's very

1306
01:15:29,158 --> 01:15:32,731
different, And I think this is
why, at least we see more and

1307
01:15:32,731 --> 01:15:36,602
more companies with some version
of a human in the loop, that can

1308
01:15:36,602 --> 01:15:40,115
intervene because. the, if the
system stops for a couple of

1309
01:15:40,115 --> 01:15:43,212
minutes, that's not
catastrophic. in a, it's a very,

1310
01:15:43,212 --> 01:15:46,904
it's a constrained environment.
there's, if it stops for a few

1311
01:15:46,904 --> 01:15:50,715
minutes, it's not the end of the
world. it's, it's hopefully not

1312
01:15:50,715 --> 01:15:53,931
a safety consideration and
things like that. So again,

1313
01:15:53,931 --> 01:15:57,623
people have different approaches
from Taleo, which is like an,

1314
01:15:57,623 --> 01:16:01,494
The human is always in the loop,
by design, versus, Burrow, where

1315
01:16:01,494 --> 01:16:05,246
the human is in the loop on an
exception basis. and I think you

1316
01:16:05,246 --> 01:16:08,700
see, lots and lots of these
kinds of approaches, which is,

1317
01:16:08,700 --> 01:16:11,856
again, why I think the
industrial use cases have just

1318
01:16:11,856 --> 01:16:14,000
proven to be, more, more
attractive.

1319
01:16:14,000 --> 01:16:17,789
Audrow Nash: yeah, I think so
too. And it's interesting

1320
01:16:17,789 --> 01:16:21,992
because even if say you are 50
percent efficient with a human

1321
01:16:21,992 --> 01:16:26,125
operator, so it's failing to
operate autonomously 50 percent

1322
01:16:26,125 --> 01:16:30,397
of the time. Now one person is
manning two robots and then you

1323
01:16:30,397 --> 01:16:34,324
can use that as a way to get
into the market and then you

1324
01:16:34,324 --> 01:16:38,595
have data and more experience
and you can start automating and

1325
01:16:38,595 --> 01:16:42,522
keep improving that ratio. Now
it's 75%. Now you have one

1326
01:16:42,522 --> 01:16:47,000
person watching four robots with
perfect math and it keeps going,

1327
01:16:47,000 --> 01:16:50,034
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, And I
think that's, and frankly,

1328
01:16:50,034 --> 01:16:53,288
that's very much informed our
own view of to invest, people

1329
01:16:53,288 --> 01:16:56,819
that are trying to do a hundred
percent end to end automation, I

1330
01:16:56,819 --> 01:17:00,294
think there are many interesting
solutions, but again, like the

1331
01:17:00,294 --> 01:17:03,327
bar for performance is really
high and it just ends up,

1332
01:17:03,327 --> 01:17:06,802
oftentimes, just being hard to
execute, versus if you get these

1333
01:17:06,802 --> 01:17:10,278
kind of, if you figure out the
right solution that has a little

1334
01:17:10,278 --> 01:17:13,532
bit more fault tolerance, you
can have a human intervene. I

1335
01:17:13,532 --> 01:17:16,786
think that just, gives, makes
the path to commercialization

1336
01:17:16,786 --> 01:17:18,000
just that much easier.

1337
01:17:18,000 --> 01:17:20,000
Audrow Nash: Gotcha. Yeah, I
agree.

1338
01:17:20,000 --> 01:17:25,169
Audrow Nash: So speaking of that
what are some lessons we can

1339
01:17:25,169 --> 01:17:30,000
learn, and try to avoid in doing
a good robotics company?

1340
01:17:30,000 --> 01:17:34,062
Sanjay Aggarwal: The thing that
I find most often is that, when

1341
01:17:34,062 --> 01:17:37,544
you're, there's a lot of
customer excitement for these

1342
01:17:37,544 --> 01:17:41,283
solutions, right? which is
great. like that's a good place

1343
01:17:41,283 --> 01:17:45,217
to start a business, obviously,
but in the course of customer

1344
01:17:45,217 --> 01:17:49,214
excitement, the customer starts
envisioning all sorts of other

1345
01:17:49,214 --> 01:17:53,083
things that you could, like, why
can't you do this and this,

1346
01:17:53,083 --> 01:17:56,693
right? And so I think the,
danger can be that, okay, you

1347
01:17:56,693 --> 01:18:00,498
start chasing too many different
shiny objects, in a sense,

1348
01:18:00,498 --> 01:18:04,624
right? So I'll give you a simple
example. Burrow, as I, said, is

1349
01:18:04,624 --> 01:18:08,751
a good example, like they, they
make an autonomous vehicle, some

1350
01:18:08,751 --> 01:18:12,490
of their customers said, why
can't you pick crops as well,

1351
01:18:12,490 --> 01:18:16,423
right? Why don't you put an arm
on top of the system and pick

1352
01:18:16,423 --> 01:18:20,034
crops, right? Sounds, sounds
like a logical thing from a

1353
01:18:20,034 --> 01:18:23,000
customer perspective. Obviously,
if you're the

1354
01:18:23,000 --> 01:18:24,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah, you already
have robots

1355
01:18:24,000 --> 01:18:27,568
Sanjay Aggarwal: It's already
out there. Like, why don't you

1356
01:18:27,568 --> 01:18:31,136
just pick a compute? Why do I
need people to pick? Why don't

1357
01:18:31,136 --> 01:18:34,586
you pick? but again, like the
challenge with that's like a

1358
01:18:34,586 --> 01:18:37,856
very fundamentally different
technology, right? Like an

1359
01:18:37,856 --> 01:18:41,306
autonomous vehicle is very
different than a picking robot.

1360
01:18:41,306 --> 01:18:44,636
and so I think there's a lot of
temptation, for robotics

1361
01:18:44,636 --> 01:18:48,323
companies to say, Oh, okay, the
customer really wants me to do

1362
01:18:48,323 --> 01:18:52,070
this other thing. Why don't I do
that too? and in doing that, I

1363
01:18:52,070 --> 01:18:55,757
think you can get a little bit
derailed, with, not, again, you

1364
01:18:55,757 --> 01:18:59,265
got to. You got to be clever
about constraining the problem

1365
01:18:59,265 --> 01:19:03,071
in a way that's useful, there's
a large enough market, but isn't

1366
01:19:03,071 --> 01:19:06,342
going to take you down a bunch
of different tangents on

1367
01:19:06,342 --> 01:19:09,791
technology that you need to
build that maybe, is, just too

1368
01:19:09,791 --> 01:19:13,181
orthogonal to what you're,
currently building. So I think

1369
01:19:13,181 --> 01:19:16,809
that's what, I see most often,
from companies, which is, Hey,

1370
01:19:16,809 --> 01:19:20,139
like you're just trying to do
too much, in the effort to

1371
01:19:20,139 --> 01:19:23,767
satisfy customer demand, expand
the market, things like that.

1372
01:19:23,767 --> 01:19:27,275
that's by far the most common.
and then the second again is

1373
01:19:27,275 --> 01:19:29,000
like almost over engineering,

1374
01:19:29,000 --> 01:19:30,000
Audrow Nash: Oh, definitely.

1375
01:19:30,000 --> 01:19:34,721
Sanjay Aggarwal: right. you can,
there's always ways to make the

1376
01:19:34,721 --> 01:19:38,852
system better, right? better
sensors, more sophisticated

1377
01:19:38,852 --> 01:19:43,426
hardware, whatever it is, what,
the right, what's good enough,

1378
01:19:43,426 --> 01:19:47,779
is, a tough, is a tough call to
make. And being smart about

1379
01:19:47,779 --> 01:19:52,057
that, because again, like
capital is not unlimited. And so

1380
01:19:52,057 --> 01:19:56,484
you gotta be, you gotta make the
right choices around, doing

1381
01:19:56,484 --> 01:20:00,910
something that's going to work
well enough without making it

1382
01:20:00,910 --> 01:20:05,336
perfect. so I think these are,
probably the two most common,

1383
01:20:05,336 --> 01:20:06,000
examples.

1384
01:20:06,000 --> 01:20:09,157
Audrow Nash: Yeah, I see those
too. And it's interesting

1385
01:20:09,157 --> 01:20:12,371
because, especially for the
first one where companies are

1386
01:20:12,371 --> 01:20:15,810
trying to find product market
fit and the customer is telling

1387
01:20:15,810 --> 01:20:19,249
them, we would like this, we
would like this. And so it's oh,

1388
01:20:19,249 --> 01:20:22,294
I want to go find the good
market fit, but it's like a

1389
01:20:22,294 --> 01:20:25,000
complete diversion from what
they're working on.

1390
01:20:25,000 --> 01:20:27,000
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah. Yeah,
absolutely.

1391
01:20:27,000 --> 01:20:32,845
Audrow Nash: Being that you are
an investor, what kinds of

1392
01:20:32,845 --> 01:20:38,992
things can a company do to make
themselves very attractive to

1393
01:20:38,992 --> 01:20:40,000
investors?

1394
01:20:40,000 --> 01:20:42,682
Sanjay Aggarwal: again, it
depends on the stage, obviously,

1395
01:20:42,682 --> 01:20:43,000
is your

1396
01:20:43,000 --> 01:20:44,000
Audrow Nash: So maybe seed and
A.

1397
01:20:44,000 --> 01:20:47,532
Sanjay Aggarwal: again, like
having, deep domain knowledge,

1398
01:20:47,532 --> 01:20:51,363
having, a strong technical team,
all of those are prerequisites,

1399
01:20:51,363 --> 01:20:55,074
understanding you know, one of
the reasons why logistics today

1400
01:20:55,074 --> 01:20:58,366
is a little bit challenging is
that, there are a lot of

1401
01:20:58,366 --> 01:21:01,898
solutions doing similar ish
things. and so finding a unique

1402
01:21:01,898 --> 01:21:05,729
use case or market segment that
you're going after, that is not,

1403
01:21:05,729 --> 01:21:09,201
super competitive, these are
just like the standard things

1404
01:21:09,201 --> 01:21:12,912
that you would look for at any
early stage company. going back

1405
01:21:12,912 --> 01:21:16,683
to the question of, okay, what
makes for an attractive, B round

1406
01:21:16,683 --> 01:21:20,275
or C round, what I always feel
like is the important is that

1407
01:21:20,275 --> 01:21:23,507
like it's very hard to pitch an
investor on a bunch of

1408
01:21:23,507 --> 01:21:26,739
contracts, that have not been
executed, right? Because

1409
01:21:26,739 --> 01:21:30,271
inevitably, yeah, it's not to
say that the contracts aren't

1410
01:21:30,271 --> 01:21:33,623
real. I think the problem is
that, are they going to get

1411
01:21:33,623 --> 01:21:37,394
executed? Are they going to get
they'd be renewed. Three months

1412
01:21:37,394 --> 01:21:41,106
or six months or not even that.
I'm just saying that, they've,

1413
01:21:41,106 --> 01:21:44,877
signed up to deploy a bunch of
systems, but is it going to take

1414
01:21:44,877 --> 01:21:48,588
three months? Are they going to
take six months? They're going

1415
01:21:48,588 --> 01:21:52,299
to take, like it's unpredictable
oftentimes, because there are

1416
01:21:52,299 --> 01:21:55,951
all sorts of things that happen,
like you're integrating into

1417
01:21:55,951 --> 01:21:59,782
real world systems. And they may
have other priorities. They may

1418
01:21:59,782 --> 01:22:03,014
have to upgrade their
infrastructure. They may have to

1419
01:22:03,014 --> 01:22:06,486
change out, maybe there's some
integration with this other

1420
01:22:06,486 --> 01:22:09,898
thing. So there are a lot of
dependencies that you as the

1421
01:22:09,898 --> 01:22:13,549
company cannot control and I
think it's super important, not,

1422
01:22:13,549 --> 01:22:17,261
the contracts are important, but
it's super important to have,

1423
01:22:17,261 --> 01:22:20,373
number one deployments, live
deployments that are in

1424
01:22:20,373 --> 01:22:24,025
production meaning used every
day, not Once in a while, but I

1425
01:22:24,025 --> 01:22:26,000
actually used day in and day
out,

1426
01:22:26,000 --> 01:22:29,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah.

1427
01:22:29,000 --> 01:22:31,500
Sanjay Aggarwal: which, which
have high utilization, which is

1428
01:22:31,500 --> 01:22:33,836
not, yeah, we did it. We, we
tried it out for a couple of

1429
01:22:33,836 --> 01:22:34,000
days

1430
01:22:34,000 --> 01:22:35,000
Audrow Nash: It worked once.

1431
01:22:35,000 --> 01:22:38,261
Sanjay Aggarwal: And yeah, and
we, it's off on the side

1432
01:22:38,261 --> 01:22:41,463
because, oh, we have this
problem or whatever. I think

1433
01:22:41,463 --> 01:22:44,961
that's not convincing. So really
focusing on, not a hundred

1434
01:22:44,961 --> 01:22:48,460
customers, but even just one
customer or two customers that

1435
01:22:48,460 --> 01:22:52,076
are like deeply engaged, using
the system day in and day out.

1436
01:22:52,076 --> 01:22:55,634
Ideally went from one system to
two systems to 10 systems or

1437
01:22:55,634 --> 01:22:59,488
whatever the appropriate numbers
are, but are like demonstrated a

1438
01:22:59,488 --> 01:23:03,046
willingness to really go all in
on the product. for, most of

1439
01:23:03,046 --> 01:23:06,781
these companies, it's, really a
land and expand where you start

1440
01:23:06,781 --> 01:23:10,279
with an initial deployment, and
they the customer tests it,

1441
01:23:10,279 --> 01:23:13,718
figures out it's at work or not.
very much. And if they're

1442
01:23:13,718 --> 01:23:17,572
excited, they start buying more.
and so until you can prove that,

1443
01:23:17,572 --> 01:23:21,249
I think it doesn't, it doesn't
matter how cool your technology

1444
01:23:21,249 --> 01:23:24,865
is, that's the ultimate proof,
that at least I as an investor

1445
01:23:24,865 --> 01:23:27,000
look for when looking at
businesses.

1446
01:23:27,000 --> 01:23:29,333
Audrow Nash: It makes good
sense. I would imagine more

1447
01:23:29,333 --> 01:23:32,056
investors do that too. You want
to see some buy in. You want to

1448
01:23:32,056 --> 01:23:34,000
see that it's working. These
kinds of things.

1449
01:23:34,000 --> 01:23:36,000
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah.

1450
01:23:36,000 --> 01:23:40,957
Audrow Nash: what, from your
perspective, are some of the

1451
01:23:40,957 --> 01:23:44,000
biggest challenges in robotics?
. .

1452
01:23:44,000 --> 01:23:47,597
Sanjay Aggarwal: there are, a
few. one is obviously these are

1453
01:23:47,597 --> 01:23:51,430
like real physical systems, so a
lot can go wrong, and with that,

1454
01:23:51,430 --> 01:23:54,674
like the cycle times are just
longer inherently, right?

1455
01:23:54,674 --> 01:23:58,153
there's usually a piece of
hardware and a piece of software

1456
01:23:58,153 --> 01:24:01,868
and yeah, you can iterate on the
software pretty quickly, there

1457
01:24:01,868 --> 01:24:05,524
may be, hardware issues, right?
You need to change, the sensor

1458
01:24:05,524 --> 01:24:08,768
isn't quite working, or the
motor that you picked isn't

1459
01:24:08,768 --> 01:24:12,070
quite working, or the, the arm,
is, out of tolerance, or

1460
01:24:12,070 --> 01:24:15,726
whatever it is, right? So there
are all these kind of physical

1461
01:24:15,726 --> 01:24:19,323
limitations that increase cycle
times, so I think that's, one

1462
01:24:19,323 --> 01:24:22,626
thing that you have to be,
recognize and also figure out

1463
01:24:22,626 --> 01:24:26,341
how to navigate, to, maintain,
because, startups are all about,

1464
01:24:26,341 --> 01:24:29,820
fast iteration. That's what,
that's the mantra of, startups

1465
01:24:29,820 --> 01:24:33,004
and how do you do that in a
hardware oriented robotics

1466
01:24:33,004 --> 01:24:36,189
company, is, a bit of a
different challenge, but still

1467
01:24:36,189 --> 01:24:39,845
needs to be, achieved in some
way. and related to that then is

1468
01:24:39,845 --> 01:24:43,442
just the amount of capital that
may be required, right? That,

1469
01:24:43,442 --> 01:24:46,863
changing hardware, making, you
need a much broader. Set of

1470
01:24:46,863 --> 01:24:50,696
people. it's not just a bunch of
software engineers. You probably

1471
01:24:50,696 --> 01:24:54,470
need people that understand how
to build like the infrastructure

1472
01:24:54,470 --> 01:24:57,713
part of the software who
understand perception systems,

1473
01:24:57,713 --> 01:25:01,251
who understand autonomy, then
you need mechanical engineers,

1474
01:25:01,251 --> 01:25:04,554
system integral, system
integration people. So there are

1475
01:25:04,554 --> 01:25:08,210
a lot of different disciplines
that you need to hire, combined

1476
01:25:08,210 --> 01:25:11,748
with longer cycle time just
means that capital, your capital

1477
01:25:11,748 --> 01:25:15,345
requirements might be more than
a classical software company.

1478
01:25:15,345 --> 01:25:19,178
And so how do you navigate that,
capital requirement, not only in

1479
01:25:19,178 --> 01:25:22,776
the early days, but even as you
scale, because funding all of

1480
01:25:22,776 --> 01:25:26,609
it, with equity alone can become
potentially quite expensive. and

1481
01:25:26,609 --> 01:25:29,911
so are there, especially as
you're starting getting into

1482
01:25:29,911 --> 01:25:33,567
production, and you have your
supply chain up and running, can

1483
01:25:33,567 --> 01:25:37,282
you find other. Opportunities,
maybe, some kind of debt sort of

1484
01:25:37,282 --> 01:25:40,762
funding mechanisms to offset
some of the capital needs that

1485
01:25:40,762 --> 01:25:42,000
you have to scale up.

1486
01:25:42,000 --> 01:25:44,000
Audrow Nash: Interesting. Yeah,
makes sense.

1487
01:25:44,000 --> 01:25:47,282
Audrow Nash: What do you think
are some of the biggest

1488
01:25:47,282 --> 01:25:50,928
opportunities for new robotics
companies? Like where, if you

1489
01:25:50,928 --> 01:25:54,514
were an entrepreneur, where
would you be looking to start a

1490
01:25:54,514 --> 01:25:55,000
company?

1491
01:25:55,000 --> 01:25:58,532
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, and this
is again, like a little bit

1492
01:25:58,532 --> 01:26:02,124
informed by what we've been
looking at, which is that, areas

1493
01:26:02,124 --> 01:26:05,477
like logistics. they're
obviously there, there have been

1494
01:26:05,477 --> 01:26:09,368
the, in some ways, the, the most
popular area of robotics, but I,

1495
01:26:09,368 --> 01:26:13,140
I say today, like if you're an
early stage founder, It's pretty

1496
01:26:13,140 --> 01:26:16,672
hard to find a net new use case
that nobody has thought of,

1497
01:26:16,672 --> 01:26:20,384
because, like there's versions
of almost everything, right? So

1498
01:26:20,384 --> 01:26:24,275
I, there's always something new,
but it's, the bar is pretty high

1499
01:26:24,275 --> 01:26:27,568
to find something that's
different and better than what

1500
01:26:27,568 --> 01:26:31,100
already exists in the market,
but if you're looking at, and

1501
01:26:31,100 --> 01:26:34,333
that's, certainly true in
logistics, or, some of these

1502
01:26:34,333 --> 01:26:38,165
other kind of popular areas, but
if you're going if you're going

1503
01:26:38,165 --> 01:26:41,757
into agriculture, for example,
it's still really early days,

1504
01:26:41,757 --> 01:26:45,529
there's a lot of stuff that can
potentially be automated. there

1505
01:26:45,529 --> 01:26:49,300
have been companies trying to do
harvesting. but, there's other

1506
01:26:49,300 --> 01:26:52,533
stuff, whether it's weeding
robots, or people spraying

1507
01:26:52,533 --> 01:26:56,425
pesticides, or Burrow does, just
moving crops around the field. I

1508
01:26:56,425 --> 01:27:00,136
think it's still really early
days. those companies are, still

1509
01:27:00,136 --> 01:27:03,908
pretty nascent in terms of what
they're trying to do now. And I

1510
01:27:03,908 --> 01:27:07,201
am, I imagine there's tons of
additional use cases that

1511
01:27:07,201 --> 01:27:10,853
haven't even been, envisioned
yet. So I think, to me, part of

1512
01:27:10,853 --> 01:27:14,625
it is, finding industries that
are probably underserved, from a

1513
01:27:14,625 --> 01:27:18,217
technology perspective, today.
agriculture being a good one,

1514
01:27:18,217 --> 01:27:21,869
construction being another one,
where it's still pretty early

1515
01:27:21,869 --> 01:27:25,281
days. There are a lot of
companies trying to do different

1516
01:27:25,281 --> 01:27:28,634
food oriented robotics, around,
how do you automate food

1517
01:27:28,634 --> 01:27:32,286
preparation, for example, or
food assembly, things like that,

1518
01:27:32,286 --> 01:27:36,177
that are pretty, still, I think,
pretty greenfield opportunities.

1519
01:27:36,177 --> 01:27:39,949
So I think that's, part of it,
in my view is like, I think that

1520
01:27:39,949 --> 01:27:43,720
for early stage entrepreneurs,
there's probably, it's probably,

1521
01:27:43,720 --> 01:27:47,313
It's just, they're just less
competitive, shall we say. And,

1522
01:27:47,313 --> 01:27:50,905
and, that's to me is always a
good place to start if you can

1523
01:27:50,905 --> 01:27:53,000
find the right, the right use
case.

1524
01:27:53,000 --> 01:27:54,000
Audrow Nash: Yeah.

1525
01:27:53,000 --> 01:27:58,153
Audrow Nash: Now this, may be
too big and broad of a question,

1526
01:27:58,153 --> 01:28:03,223
but okay, you pick a domain, and
you are an early stage, like

1527
01:28:03,223 --> 01:28:08,542
basically it's you and maybe you
have a another person who wants

1528
01:28:08,542 --> 01:28:13,694
to start a company with you. how
would you go about starting a

1529
01:28:13,694 --> 01:28:18,515
robotics company? Like, how,
what would you think would be

1530
01:28:18,515 --> 01:28:23,086
the, what would be an efficient
path to get growing and

1531
01:28:23,086 --> 01:28:24,000
everything?

1532
01:28:24,000 --> 01:28:27,736
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, I think
finding the right team is

1533
01:28:27,736 --> 01:28:31,673
probably a good place to start,
and I think having somebody

1534
01:28:31,673 --> 01:28:35,342
with, the combination of
technical expertise and domain

1535
01:28:35,342 --> 01:28:39,145
expertise are, the magic
combination here, where you have

1536
01:28:39,145 --> 01:28:43,148
somebody that does understand
the market and can go and talk

1537
01:28:43,148 --> 01:28:46,951
to potential customers and
validate ideas and things like

1538
01:28:46,951 --> 01:28:50,821
that, along with a technical co
founder who can, build the

1539
01:28:50,821 --> 01:28:54,357
initial, or at least lead the
creation of the initial

1540
01:28:54,357 --> 01:28:58,227
prototypes. again, like these
are, in general, are systems

1541
01:28:58,227 --> 01:29:02,296
that, that just require more
resources. It's not, necessarily

1542
01:29:02,296 --> 01:29:06,299
one person who can, sit and code
up the prototype. But, that

1543
01:29:06,299 --> 01:29:10,503
being said, there's a lot more
off the shelf stuff that you can

1544
01:29:10,503 --> 01:29:14,506
buy. off the shelf robotic arms,
off the shelf, small, small

1545
01:29:14,506 --> 01:29:18,375
vehicles. things like that you
can at least build, initial

1546
01:29:18,375 --> 01:29:22,312
prototypes on top of. and but I
think the starting point is

1547
01:29:22,312 --> 01:29:26,382
definitely to Figure out, what,
what problem you're trying to

1548
01:29:26,382 --> 01:29:30,051
solve, right? And having
somebody on the team who comes

1549
01:29:30,051 --> 01:29:33,988
with, a deep understanding, of
the industry and then can go

1550
01:29:33,988 --> 01:29:37,857
and, go deep and, talk to
potential customers and validate

1551
01:29:37,857 --> 01:29:41,727
ideas before getting too far, in
terms of, building stuff,

1552
01:29:41,727 --> 01:29:45,863
because you can waste a lot of
time building stuff that nobody

1553
01:29:45,863 --> 01:29:50,000
wants. I think it's, that can be
a very expensive proposition.

1554
01:29:50,000 --> 01:29:55,496
Audrow Nash: And then how do you
I suppose some people or some

1555
01:29:55,496 --> 01:30:00,461
small teams may need to seek
funding early just to start

1556
01:30:00,461 --> 01:30:06,135
working on something. but when,
do you think companies should go

1557
01:30:06,135 --> 01:30:11,454
for a seed round or a series A
funding? Like how do you know

1558
01:30:11,454 --> 01:30:15,000
you're ready for either of those
rounds?

1559
01:30:15,000 --> 01:30:19,176
Sanjay Aggarwal: I think today
for series A at least, like you

1560
01:30:19,176 --> 01:30:23,554
need to have, initial customers,
right? I think it's very hard if

1561
01:30:23,554 --> 01:30:27,596
you don't have a. It doesn't
have to be the final machine or

1562
01:30:27,596 --> 01:30:31,503
device, but you need to have a
device that's probably gone

1563
01:30:31,503 --> 01:30:35,544
through a couple of iterations,
is good enough for people to

1564
01:30:35,544 --> 01:30:39,855
deploy, ideally in some initial
production use cases, and, start

1565
01:30:39,855 --> 01:30:43,896
to use and validate that it
works, that it delivers ROI, and

1566
01:30:43,896 --> 01:30:47,938
the customer is excited about
it. I think these are, there's

1567
01:30:47,938 --> 01:30:51,912
no revenue target or whatever,
but yeah, you want, At least

1568
01:30:51,912 --> 01:30:56,021
one. And I, at least a couple
customers who have used it, who

1569
01:30:56,021 --> 01:30:59,860
are using it, happy to use it,
every day. and are getting

1570
01:30:59,860 --> 01:31:04,104
value, demonstratable value. I
think that's the bar for a se, a

1571
01:31:04,104 --> 01:31:08,212
series A at least. and seed, I
think seed can be all over the

1572
01:31:08,212 --> 01:31:12,119
map, right? there, there are
plenty of seed investors that

1573
01:31:12,119 --> 01:31:15,824
will invest in just a business
plan. here's a, here's a

1574
01:31:15,824 --> 01:31:20,067
PowerPoint presentation with a,
with our idea. Our idea, that's

1575
01:31:20,067 --> 01:31:23,772
typically. for more kind of
proven entrepreneurs, so to

1576
01:31:23,772 --> 01:31:28,083
speak, like maybe you've already
built a business before, or you

1577
01:31:28,083 --> 01:31:31,585
are an early employee at Kiva,
and so you have, some

1578
01:31:31,585 --> 01:31:35,829
credibility, around what you're
trying to build, everything to,

1579
01:31:35,829 --> 01:31:39,668
okay, yeah, we've built the
initial prototype, we've done

1580
01:31:39,668 --> 01:31:43,306
some proof of concept to
demonstrate viability. things

1581
01:31:43,306 --> 01:31:47,010
like that, can, may, be
required, and there are a bunch

1582
01:31:47,010 --> 01:31:50,850
of, there are all sorts of
labels for, friends and family

1583
01:31:50,850 --> 01:31:54,959
rounds and pre seed rounds, so
there are all sorts of labels,

1584
01:31:54,959 --> 01:31:58,259
but, I think it's very,
situational, if you will,

1585
01:31:58,259 --> 01:32:02,435
depending on, your own kind of
credibility as an entrepreneur,

1586
01:32:02,435 --> 01:32:06,342
the team that you've built, the
use case that you're going

1587
01:32:06,342 --> 01:32:10,047
after, and, frankly, just
finding an investor with whom

1588
01:32:10,047 --> 01:32:12,000
all of those things resonate.

1589
01:32:12,000 --> 01:32:15,437
Audrow Nash: Yeah, definitely.
And then for the person or the

1590
01:32:15,437 --> 01:32:18,648
group starting a company, what
should they look for in an

1591
01:32:18,648 --> 01:32:21,915
investor? Do you just want
anyone who will give you money,

1592
01:32:21,915 --> 01:32:24,000
but I'm sure you want some
expertise.

1593
01:32:24,000 --> 01:32:26,990
Sanjay Aggarwal: That's probably
a good starting point to get

1594
01:32:26,990 --> 01:32:29,000
somebody who's gonna give you
money. But,

1595
01:32:29,000 --> 01:32:30,000
Audrow Nash: Definitely. ha

1596
01:32:30,000 --> 01:32:33,842
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, I think
there are, there are definitely

1597
01:32:33,842 --> 01:32:37,499
more and more, investors that
are active in robotics. So I,

1598
01:32:37,499 --> 01:32:41,279
always tell people that the, you
can go and try to meet every

1599
01:32:41,279 --> 01:32:45,245
investor out there, right? But I
think the most productive path,

1600
01:32:45,245 --> 01:32:48,902
at the end of the day is going
to be, number one, investors

1601
01:32:48,902 --> 01:32:52,620
that have done deals in this
space before, right? So they're

1602
01:32:52,620 --> 01:32:56,401
not, just hey, I'm going to take
a flyer on my first robotics

1603
01:32:56,401 --> 01:32:59,933
company. but rather, oh yeah,
we've done two or three, we

1604
01:32:59,933 --> 01:33:03,589
understand, what this looks
like, right? Because it has its

1605
01:33:03,589 --> 01:33:07,246
own somewhat unique dynamic in
terms of, the path. And as I

1606
01:33:07,246 --> 01:33:10,840
said, oftentimes for a Series A,
there's like the Series A

1607
01:33:10,840 --> 01:33:14,435
extension, and maybe there's
multiple Series A extensions,

1608
01:33:14,435 --> 01:33:18,091
right? So you want Ideally, a
Series A investor who has the

1609
01:33:18,091 --> 01:33:21,500
ability to do that and
willingness to put more money on

1610
01:33:21,500 --> 01:33:25,280
in before a proper Series B,
right? So that may be a slightly

1611
01:33:25,280 --> 01:33:28,813
larger fund. but, so I think,
getting investors that have

1612
01:33:28,813 --> 01:33:32,779
experience in the category that
understand, what it means, what,

1613
01:33:32,779 --> 01:33:36,373
does this look like? who's able
and willing to support the

1614
01:33:36,373 --> 01:33:39,906
company through, potentially a
couple of different rounds

1615
01:33:39,906 --> 01:33:43,314
before they raise their next
major round. if they have,

1616
01:33:43,314 --> 01:33:47,219
experience in related spaces, I
think it can always be helpful.

1617
01:33:47,219 --> 01:33:50,689
obviously you don't want an
investor who's invested in a

1618
01:33:50,689 --> 01:33:54,098
competitor, but. Now, they've
done a couple of deals in

1619
01:33:54,098 --> 01:33:57,196
logistics, and I have a
logistics startup, so they

1620
01:33:57,196 --> 01:34:00,791
understand and they can be
helpful, actually, is like the,

1621
01:34:00,791 --> 01:34:04,385
even better, they can help you
think about how to do go to

1622
01:34:04,385 --> 01:34:08,166
market, because they have other
companies that have sold into

1623
01:34:08,166 --> 01:34:11,884
the logistics space. And so they
can be, helpful for how you

1624
01:34:11,884 --> 01:34:15,416
think about your own, go to
market strategy, for example.

1625
01:34:15,416 --> 01:34:19,259
So, I think these are like the
basic, Starting point. And as I

1626
01:34:19,259 --> 01:34:22,915
said, I think there's just more
and more such investors out

1627
01:34:22,915 --> 01:34:26,014
there. So at least the
opportunity set is, getting

1628
01:34:26,014 --> 01:34:29,856
wider, which is, great. and then
it's just a matter of, again,

1629
01:34:29,856 --> 01:34:33,389
just finding the right, the
right party, which you, who's

1630
01:34:33,389 --> 01:34:35,000
excited about your vision.

1631
01:34:35,000 --> 01:34:39,000
Audrow Nash: Hell yeah. Awesome.
Let's see.

1632
01:34:39,000 --> 01:34:43,219
Audrow Nash: going back to the
State of Robotics report, was

1633
01:34:43,219 --> 01:34:47,227
there anything in it that you
found that was particularly

1634
01:34:47,227 --> 01:34:48,000
surprising?

1635
01:34:48,000 --> 01:34:52,017
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, and I
think when we did it last year,

1636
01:34:52,017 --> 01:34:56,033
I think this, again, this kind
of, shift from AV to vertical

1637
01:34:56,033 --> 01:34:59,715
robotics was, I think we
intuitively thought it, but it

1638
01:34:59,715 --> 01:35:03,665
was it was, surprising how
rapidly the shift was happening,

1639
01:35:03,665 --> 01:35:07,883
in some ways. so I think that,
reinforced our own view and gave

1640
01:35:07,883 --> 01:35:12,167
some, further impetus for us to
say, Hey, yeah, this is probably

1641
01:35:12,167 --> 01:35:16,318
the right place to be focusing
our efforts. I think the second

1642
01:35:16,318 --> 01:35:20,469
thing was that the exit markets
were still really early. there

1643
01:35:20,469 --> 01:35:24,753
were, probably fewer exits than
I might've imagined, in a sense.

1644
01:35:24,753 --> 01:35:28,770
and again, I think it comes back
to. we're still in the very

1645
01:35:28,770 --> 01:35:32,787
early days of this market. it's
only a few years old in some

1646
01:35:32,787 --> 01:35:36,736
ways, at least from a venture
capital perspective. and the,

1647
01:35:36,736 --> 01:35:40,753
just the, number of exits was,
is small, and hopefully it'll

1648
01:35:40,753 --> 01:35:44,569
grow, go bigger, but it was
probably a little bit smaller

1649
01:35:44,569 --> 01:35:48,117
than I, that I quite
anticipated. again, I think that

1650
01:35:48,117 --> 01:35:51,933
is changing and will change,
pretty rapidly. But, I think

1651
01:35:51,933 --> 01:35:55,883
that was, that was a little
surprising. And then, the third

1652
01:35:55,883 --> 01:36:00,100
thing was again, this, kind of,
what I call like the squeeze in

1653
01:36:00,100 --> 01:36:04,452
the series B and C rounds, which
is, there are a lot of, there is

1654
01:36:04,452 --> 01:36:08,669
a lot of excitement in the early
stage, even like Y Combinator,

1655
01:36:08,669 --> 01:36:12,686
is like the, the bellwether of
all early stage investing, as

1656
01:36:12,686 --> 01:36:16,636
robotics is one of their core
focus areas this time, right?

1657
01:36:16,636 --> 01:36:20,586
there's obviously a lot of early
stage excitement, but, the

1658
01:36:20,586 --> 01:36:24,603
difficulties of raising the
series B and C was probably more

1659
01:36:24,603 --> 01:36:28,285
pronounced than I fully
appreciated. But again, I think

1660
01:36:28,285 --> 01:36:32,033
it's just, it just puts a focus
on, getting to the right

1661
01:36:32,033 --> 01:36:35,849
metrics, getting to the right
proof points, in a way that

1662
01:36:35,849 --> 01:36:39,732
probably didn't exist, that
wasn't as critical a few years

1663
01:36:39,732 --> 01:36:40,000
ago.

1664
01:36:40,000 --> 01:36:43,727
Audrow Nash: Did you see any
evolution between the last year

1665
01:36:43,727 --> 01:36:47,516
one, the last year's report and
this year's report? was there

1666
01:36:47,516 --> 01:36:50,000
any, vectors of how things are
changing?

1667
01:36:50,000 --> 01:36:54,383
Sanjay Aggarwal: 2021 was just
an anomaly in general. And so I

1668
01:36:54,383 --> 01:36:58,695
think everything was looking
great then. 2023 was more of the

1669
01:36:58,695 --> 01:37:02,936
same of 2022, but just smaller,
a lot smaller, right? if you

1670
01:37:02,936 --> 01:37:07,178
look at the market overall, I
think even I think 2022 itself

1671
01:37:07,178 --> 01:37:11,490
was off like 30, 40%, was off,
Yet another, 40 50 percent off

1672
01:37:11,490 --> 01:37:15,872
2020. It's pretty marked how,
much it's fallen, although a lot

1673
01:37:15,872 --> 01:37:19,619
of that's been just driven by
the kind of the drop in

1674
01:37:19,619 --> 01:37:23,790
autonomous vehicle investing. If
you look at, this vertical

1675
01:37:23,790 --> 01:37:28,314
robotics, as we call it, that's,
that has definitely shrank, but

1676
01:37:28,314 --> 01:37:31,000
not as much as the rest of the
market.

1677
01:37:31,000 --> 01:37:33,960
Audrow Nash: Gotcha. What do you
expect? if you look out another

1678
01:37:33,960 --> 01:37:36,873
year, do you expect that trend
to continue? Do you expect it to

1679
01:37:36,873 --> 01:37:39,000
pick back up a little bit? Any
thoughts there?

1680
01:37:39,000 --> 01:37:42,668
Sanjay Aggarwal: I'm hopeful
that 2023 will be the kind of

1681
01:37:42,668 --> 01:37:46,715
the bottoming of the market, in
a way. things will start to pick

1682
01:37:46,715 --> 01:37:50,320
up again. again, I think,
entrepreneurs have, heard, from

1683
01:37:50,320 --> 01:37:54,051
the market as to what they need
to focus on. And so I think

1684
01:37:54,051 --> 01:37:57,909
they'll just be way more focused
on delivering. these are all

1685
01:37:57,909 --> 01:38:01,577
super talented people. and I
think they will, adjust their

1686
01:38:01,577 --> 01:38:05,308
own strategies to deliver on,
some of the expectations that

1687
01:38:05,308 --> 01:38:09,356
people have. And so they'll just
be better equipped to, to raise

1688
01:38:09,356 --> 01:38:12,834
money as well. and, and as I
said, like the early stage

1689
01:38:12,834 --> 01:38:15,933
activity is hopefully a
precursor for later stage

1690
01:38:15,933 --> 01:38:19,727
activity, right? just the sheer
number of companies that are

1691
01:38:19,727 --> 01:38:23,711
raising like those, they won't
all be successful, but, A lot of

1692
01:38:23,711 --> 01:38:27,253
them will be successful. And
there's been a lot of money

1693
01:38:27,253 --> 01:38:31,364
that's gone into those companies
in the last two, three years. So

1694
01:38:31,364 --> 01:38:34,968
those, as those companies
mature, I imagine there'll be a

1695
01:38:34,968 --> 01:38:38,953
lot of, high quality companies
coming out, ready to raise their

1696
01:38:38,953 --> 01:38:43,000
B and C and so forth. so again,
we're optimistic, again, I think

1697
01:38:43,000 --> 01:38:47,111
that the, last year in some ways
was a wake up call for, founders

1698
01:38:47,111 --> 01:38:50,905
in terms of what is it, what do
they really should focus on,

1699
01:38:50,905 --> 01:38:54,510
from a business building
perspective. and, I, would think

1700
01:38:54,510 --> 01:38:58,431
and hope that, 2024 and beyond
will, things will start to pick

1701
01:38:58,431 --> 01:38:59,000
up again.

1702
01:38:59,000 --> 01:39:03,650
Audrow Nash: Gotcha. and what do
you make of the Y Combinator?

1703
01:39:03,650 --> 01:39:07,775
where they're focusing on
robotics, I think that's very

1704
01:39:07,775 --> 01:39:11,000
exciting, but what are your
thoughts on it?

1705
01:39:11,000 --> 01:39:14,320
Sanjay Aggarwal: yeah, I feel
and I, I'm no expert on Y

1706
01:39:14,320 --> 01:39:18,123
Combinator, but my general sense
is that they've, Over the last

1707
01:39:18,123 --> 01:39:21,805
few years, they started, in the
early days, it was all about,

1708
01:39:21,805 --> 01:39:25,246
kind of consumer software and
then enterprise software, I

1709
01:39:25,246 --> 01:39:28,929
think, they've always been. a,
hopefully like a step ahead of

1710
01:39:28,929 --> 01:39:32,792
what the next trends are in the
market. And so you've definitely

1711
01:39:32,792 --> 01:39:36,474
seen, a lot more focus, for Y
Combinator on emerging segments

1712
01:39:36,474 --> 01:39:40,398
of venture, not the traditional,
what's your next consumer app or

1713
01:39:40,398 --> 01:39:43,658
what's your next, piece of
enterprise software. that's

1714
01:39:43,658 --> 01:39:47,280
always there and, it always will
be there, but. You see them

1715
01:39:47,280 --> 01:39:50,539
talking a lot more about,
climate related startups or,

1716
01:39:50,539 --> 01:39:54,222
robotics in this example, or,
they were probably early to the

1717
01:39:54,222 --> 01:39:58,025
crypto craze, like all of that
kind of stuff. I think they were

1718
01:39:58,025 --> 01:40:01,828
there, not that they didn't, may
not get it right all the time,

1719
01:40:01,828 --> 01:40:05,329
but I think they're just a
leading indicator of what, what

1720
01:40:05,329 --> 01:40:08,830
investors, are going to be or
are excited about, in the go

1721
01:40:08,830 --> 01:40:12,392
forward times. Cause again,
Investment is all ideally about

1722
01:40:12,392 --> 01:40:16,134
betting on the future, not on
the past, right? And so you want

1723
01:40:16,134 --> 01:40:19,817
to find kind of the next, the
next big thing, so to speak. as

1724
01:40:19,817 --> 01:40:23,620
opposed to just replicating what
was successful in the, and not

1725
01:40:23,620 --> 01:40:27,000
always just replicating what was
successful in the past.

1726
01:40:27,000 --> 01:40:28,000
Audrow Nash: Definitely.

1727
01:40:28,000 --> 01:40:33,096
Audrow Nash: And then, wrapping
up, what do you imagine for the

1728
01:40:33,096 --> 01:40:38,110
future? Like, where do you think
robotics is going to be in 10

1729
01:40:38,110 --> 01:40:39,000
years, say?

1730
01:40:39,000 --> 01:40:42,207
Sanjay Aggarwal: really hard to
predict. I think that,

1731
01:40:42,207 --> 01:40:45,890
technology is changing pretty
rapidly. and so I think just the

1732
01:40:45,890 --> 01:40:49,691
capability of what these systems
can do, is I think it's hard to

1733
01:40:49,691 --> 01:40:53,374
envision exactly, what that's
going to look like. I, think, as

1734
01:40:53,374 --> 01:40:56,759
you, yeah, I just think that
the, range of use cases will

1735
01:40:56,759 --> 01:41:00,382
start to expand significantly. I
think today, to some extent,

1736
01:41:00,382 --> 01:41:03,115
like the use cases are
constrained by what the

1737
01:41:03,115 --> 01:41:06,619
technology today enables, right?
I think as the technology,

1738
01:41:06,619 --> 01:41:09,886
expands in terms of, because
it's all about like modern

1739
01:41:09,886 --> 01:41:13,450
robotics is all about dealing
with unstructured environments

1740
01:41:13,450 --> 01:41:16,598
fundamentally, right?
Historically, the robotics that

1741
01:41:16,598 --> 01:41:20,042
existed for the last 50 years
was around highly structured

1742
01:41:20,042 --> 01:41:23,250
environments doing highly
structured things. It wasn't

1743
01:41:23,250 --> 01:41:26,398
about. Perceiving the
environment. It was about, move

1744
01:41:26,398 --> 01:41:30,080
this, this, motor from, point A
to point B, And that, and just

1745
01:41:30,080 --> 01:41:33,407
do that over and over again. And
that's what it was very

1746
01:41:33,407 --> 01:41:36,970
structured, very predefined. Now
it's all about unstructured

1747
01:41:36,970 --> 01:41:40,653
environments. Like how do you
navigate, in the real world? And

1748
01:41:40,653 --> 01:41:44,454
I think that ability is going to
continue to expand, right? Like

1749
01:41:44,454 --> 01:41:47,721
the ability to perceive the
world and kind of deal with

1750
01:41:47,721 --> 01:41:51,107
uncertainty, is obviously the
core of what, modern AI is,

1751
01:41:51,107 --> 01:41:54,611
enabling, us to do. And so I
think that just opens the, the

1752
01:41:54,611 --> 01:41:58,056
range of use cases in a much,
increasingly broader, bigger

1753
01:41:58,056 --> 01:42:01,620
way. So I think there would be
two things. one is like these

1754
01:42:01,620 --> 01:42:05,243
companies that have been funded
today, not all of them, but a

1755
01:42:05,243 --> 01:42:08,985
lot of them will become really
successful, like they will start

1756
01:42:08,985 --> 01:42:12,608
to be out there. You'll start to
see them. maybe not on their

1757
01:42:12,608 --> 01:42:16,290
sidewalk, but certainly if you
go to a factory, or you go to a

1758
01:42:16,290 --> 01:42:19,438
farm, or you go to a
construction site, I think that,

1759
01:42:19,438 --> 01:42:23,299
they'll be much more ubiquitous,
than what today. And then number

1760
01:42:23,299 --> 01:42:26,685
two, I think you'll start to
see, all sorts of, use cases

1761
01:42:26,685 --> 01:42:30,070
that you could never have
imagined that a robot could do,

1762
01:42:30,070 --> 01:42:33,575
because they have been enabled
by, much more sophisticated,

1763
01:42:33,575 --> 01:42:35,000
perception capabilities.

1764
01:42:35,000 --> 01:42:38,912
Audrow Nash: Awesome. All right,
Sanjay. Thank you. great

1765
01:42:38,912 --> 01:42:42,000
speaking to you and hearing your
perspective.

1766
01:42:42,000 --> 01:42:44,494
Sanjay Aggarwal: Yeah, thank you
very much for the time. It was,

1767
01:42:44,494 --> 01:42:45,000
a fun chat. ​

1768
01:42:45,000 --> 01:42:49,189
Audrow Nash: You made it! What
do you think? Are you as bullish

1769
01:42:49,189 --> 01:42:53,379
on robotics as Sanjay? Isn't it
surprising that there have only

1770
01:42:53,379 --> 01:42:57,302
been 25 or so robotics exits
above 250 million? What do you

1771
01:42:57,302 --> 01:43:01,491
think the timeline is for a 10
times increase in this number? I

1772
01:43:01,491 --> 01:43:05,414
bet it'll be faster than we
think. If you want to check out

1773
01:43:05,414 --> 01:43:08,939
the State of Robotics report,
the link will be in the

1774
01:43:08,939 --> 01:43:11,000
description. See you next time.
